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PACE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW MOOT 
COURT COMPETITION  
 
2009 Judges’ Edition Memorandum* 
 
TARYN L. RUCINSKI** 
SUMMARY 
This is a suit in admiralty brought by Galleon Enterprises, Inc., 
(“Galleon”), an underwater salvage company, which filed a verified 
complaint in rem seeking title to an unknown sunken vessel, or in the 
alternative, for a salvage award for services rendered. The Kingdom of 
Spain (“Spain”) on its own behalf, and the United States of America 
(“United States”) on behalf of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“COE”), 
have intervened. 
The area at issue in this case involves the Gold Coast National Marine 
Sanctuary (“GCNMS”), which surrounds the marine waters off the coast of 
New Union.  GCNMS was specifically created to protect both the natural 
and historic resources of the region, including coral formations, shipwrecks, 
deep sea coral, and Johnson seagrasses.  R 51.  Deep sea coral and Johnson 
seagrasses were previously designated as “endangered species” by the 
Secretary of Commerce, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006). R 5. The 
unknown wreck of which Galleon is seeking title is allegedly embedded in 
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1.“R” refers to the Record in this case. 
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the endangered deep sea coralline formations of the marine sanctuary floor, 
which is covered by the endangered Johnson seagrasses.  R 5, 6. 
In April 2008, Galleon initiated an exploratory underwater excavation 
in the waters of the GCNMS, approximately twenty-three and twenty-four 
nautical miles off the coast of New Union.  R 5.  During its excavations, 
Galleon unearthed several – arguably Spanish – artifacts both within and 
outside the sanctuary boundary. R 6. Galleon applied to the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) for a research and 
recovery permit in order to continue with the excavations and locate the 
originating vessel, which Galleon believed was embedded in the 
endangered deep sea coralline formations of the sanctuary floor. R 6.  
NOAA subsequently denied Galleon’s permit because Spain refused to give 
Galleon permission to excavate the wreck. R 6. In addition, Galleon applied 
for an incidental take permit for disturbing the endangered deep sea coral 
and Johnson seagrasses on the sanctuary’s seafloor. R 13.  The Secretary of 
Commerce denied Galleon’s request for an incidental take permit after 
finding that the techniques employed by Galleon degraded the coral’s 
habitat and destroyed the seagrasses. R 13. 
Despite the denial of its permits, Galleon continued with its salvage 
efforts both within and outside of the GCNMS. R 6. First, Galleon 
constructed a platform drill and drilled directly into the endangered deep 
sea coral. R 6. Next, Galleon employed a 40 year-old technique using 
“mailboxes” or prop wash deflectors to clear the debris. R 6. In this 
technique, the mailboxes are used to deflect the wash from a salvage vessel 
downwards onto the sea floor. R 6. The wash is then used to scour the 
ocean floor thereby removing both sediment and vegetation in a matter of 
seconds in order to reveal any artifacts.  R 6, 11. 
After recovering additional artifacts, Galleon filed this action in 
District Court seeking 1) title of the wreck under the Law of Finds; 2) in the 
alternative, a liberal salvage award and permission to continue salvage 
operations for rescuing artifacts in acute marine peril; 3) a declaratory 
judgment that Spain no longer has any interests in the wreck; and 4) a 
declaratory judgment preventing the United States Executive Branch from 
regulating Galleon’s salvage operations.  R 6. 
In its Order of June 25, 2008, the District Court: 1) issued a warrant 
for the arrest of the shipwreck and its artifacts; 2) granted Galleon exclusive 
salvage rights to the wreck; 3) ordered Galleon to deposit all finds with the 
court; and 4) ordered the publication of a general notice of claim.  R 6.  The 
court also ordered that specific notice be given to both the United States and 
Spain, who have chosen to intervene in this matter as follows:  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
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(i) Spain, through private counsel, filed a verified claim and answer on its 
own behalf on August 15, 2008, arguing that Galleon’s salvage attempts 
were impermissible because the wreck in question was either the 
Spanish frigate, Nuestra Senora La Contesta de Aragon, (“La 
Contesta”), or a Spanish commercial vessel, which Spain had neither 
expressly abandoned nor permitted Galleon to salvage.  In other words, 
regardless of whether the wreck was a military or a commercial vessel, 
Spain retains ownership of the wreck and has not authorized Galleon to 
commence salvage operations.  R 7.  
(ii) The United States, on behalf of the EPA and the COE, also filed an 
answer in this case on August 15, 2008, asserting its regulatory authority 
over the entire wreck and its cargo (including all wreckage found both 
inside and outside the GCNMS) pursuant to both NOAA and COE 
regulations.  The United States further argues that Galleon’s request for 
title to the wreck should be denied based on the Law of Salvage or the 
Law of Finds because Galleon was operating in violation of the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599 (2006), the 
National Marine Sanctuary Act (“NMSA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445(a) 
(2006), the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”), 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., 
(2006), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“CWA”), 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).  In other words, Galleon should not gain 
title to the wreck because it violated many laws during the salvage 
process.  R 7. 
 
 This is an action in admiralty brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 
(2006).  The parties have stipulated to standing. 
  
In its October 15, 2008 Order, the District Court:  
1. Found, assuming that the wreck was La Contesta, that Spain failed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that La Contesta was a 
sunken military craft on a “military noncommercial service” mission at 
the time of its sinking as defined by § 1408(3)(A) of the Sunken 
Military Craft Act (“SMCA”). Pub. L. 108-375, div A, title XIV, § 
1406(c)(2), 118 Stat 1811, 2094 et seq.  The court found in the 
alternative, that if the wreck was not La Contesta, the wreck would still 
not qualify as a sunken military craft within the meaning of the Act, 
because Spain failed to prove that such a vessel was listed on the Royal 
Spanish Navy register;   
3
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2. Found, that even though Galleon satisfied the first two requirements 
for a claim of ownership (the intent to reduce property to possession, 
and actual or constructive possession of the property), Galleon was 
ineligible to obtain title to the wreck under the Law of Finds, because 
Spain never expressly relinquished or abandoned any property interests 
in the wreck, which effectively precluded Galleon from attempting to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the wreck was abandoned.  
Odyssey Marine Exploration v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or 
Vessels, 2006 WL 3091531 (M.D. Fla. 2006);   
3. Held, that Galleon was entitled to a salvage award in the amount of 
90% of the value of the cargo that it recovered outside the boundaries of 
the GCNMS because Galleon acted on behalf of Spain to save its 
property, even if Spain as an owner did not make a salvage request.  
R.M.S. Titanic Inc., v. Christopher S. Haver et al., 171 F.3d 943, 963 
(4th Cir. 1999).  However, the court further held that Galleon was not 
entitled to a salvage award for the wreckage located within the GCNMS 
because Galleon failed to comply with both NOAA and COE 
regulations;   
4. Held, that Galleon violated RHA 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.(2006) when it 
obstructed navigation by constructing a drilling platform within the 
twenty-five mile contiguous zone without the authorization of the COE, 
and that Galleon violated the CWA 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (2006) when it 
discharged dredged material (propwash from mailboxing), a pollutant, 
into the navigable waters of the United States without a permit;  
5. Held, that NOAA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied 
Galleon a research and recovery permit to search for and excavate the 
wreckage within the limits of the GCNMS, under the NMSA 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1431-1445(a) (2006) because Galleon failed to obtain the consent of 
Spain, or in the alternative, that Galleon failed to show that the wreck 
belonged to a country other than Spain.  The court also held that the 
United States’ jurisdiction only extended to the boundaries of the 
GCNMS and that Galleon was free to assert claims under the Laws of 
Salvage and Finds for the parts of the wreck and cargo found outside 
the GCNMS;  
6. Held, that the Secretary of Commerce properly denied Galleon a permit 
under ESA 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006), when it determined that Galleon’s 
drilling and underwater excavation activities caused the destruction and 
habitat degradation of endangered deep sea coral and Johnson 
seagrasses in the GCNMS. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
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Following the issuance of the District Court’s Order, all parties filed 
Notices of Appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit.  
The parties were directed to brief the following six issues:  
1. Whether SMCA applies to the wreck referred to as La Contesta. 
(Galleon argues that the SMCA does not apply; Spain and the United 
States argue that SMCA does apply.)  
2. Whether the shipwreck is subject to sovereign immunity and, if so, 
whether salvage requires the consent of the sovereign.  (Galleon argues 
that sovereign immunity does not apply and the consent of Spain is not 
required; Spain argues that sovereign immunity does apply and the 
consent of Spain is required; and the United States questions whether 
the vessel is subject to the principle of sovereign immunity.)  
3. Whether NOAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Galleon a 
salvage and recovery permit for its activities within the GCNMS.  
(Galleon argues that it did; the United States and Spain argue that a 
permit was properly denied, and Spain would further argue that a 
permit cannot be issued without its consent.)  
4. Whether a NMSA permit is required for the wreck and the cargo 
irrespective of whether that cargo lies within the boundaries of the 
GCNMS.  (Galleon argues that a NMSA permit was not required; the 
United States and Spain argue that a permit was required, and Spain 
would further argue that a permit cannot be issued without its consent.)   
5. Whether the Secretary of the Commerce acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in denying Galleon an Endangered Species permit to drill 
through the endangered deep sea coral.  (Galleon argues that it did; the 
United States and Spain argue that a permit was properly denied.)   
6. Whether a COE and /or National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (“NPDES”) permit is required for Galleon’s salvage activities.  
(Galleon argues that neither permit was required for its activities; 
Spain and the United States argue that both permits were required.) 
 
This bench brief discusses each of these six issues in turn. For each 
issue, the positions of the parties and the law are discussed. Sample 
questions for the oralists are presented for each issue. 
 
5
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ISSUE I:   
WHETHER SMCA APPLIES TO THE WRECK REFERRED TO AS 
LA CONTESTA. 
A.  Positions of the Parties 
Galleon argues that the SMCA does not apply to the wreck.  
Spain argues that the SMCA does apply to the wreck.  
The United States argues that the SMCA does apply to the wreck. 
B.  Discussion 
The exact nature and identity of the unknown wreck to which Galleon 
is seeking title is in dispute.  Although the wreck is arguably of Spanish 
origin based on its location and the type of artifacts recovered, the parties 
have failed to prove whether the wreck is either a debris field, a completely 
unknown vessel, a Spanish commercial vessel, a Spanish commercial vessel 
carrying goods belonging to Spain, or the Spanish military frigate, La 
Contesta.  R 6-10. 
Galleon is arguing that the wreck is either a debris field, a vessel of 
unknown origin, or a Spanish commercial vessel carrying commercial 
goods.  In support of this contention, Galleon asserts that it has uncovered 
not a single wreck but a field of debris, including “coins and other cargo, 
within a five-mile radius.”  R 7.  Moreover, Galleon avers that it has not 
located any remains indicating a ship, such as a “keel, ballast, pile, or any 
other structure associated with a shipwreck.”  R 7.  While Galleon admits 
that the recovered artifacts could be from the Spanish military frigate La 
Contesta, Galleon also claims that it is just as likely that the artifacts came 
from jettisoned cargo, a pirate ship, or another ship lost in a storm like La 
Contesta.  R 7.  Ultimately, Galleon argues that the identity of the wreck, if 
there is a single wreck, cannot be determined until additional research and 
salvage operations are conducted.  R 7. 
Spain on the other hand, argues that the wreck is either the military 
frigate La Contesta, or a Spanish commercial vessel that was carrying 
goods belonging to Spain when it sank.  R 6.  According to the Record, in 
late summer of 1732, a fleet of twenty Spanish galleons sailed from Spain 
to Peru accompanied by six military frigates.  R 5.  One of the vessels 
assigned to the convoy was the military frigate La Contesta.  R 5.  On the 
return voyage in the early summer of 1733, almost half the fleet was 
destroyed by a hurricane in the Straits of Florida near the reef-laced coast of 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
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New Union.  R 5.  The frigate La Contesta was one of the ships destroyed 
by the hurricane.  R 5.  At the time it was sunk, La Contesta was assigned 
to carry mail, private passengers, commercial goods, gold coins, and 
precious metals from the mines of Peru.  R 5. 
In its October 15, 2008 Order, the District Court assumed that the 
wreck was La Contesta and found that Spain failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the vessel was in fact a sunken military 
craft on “military noncommercial service” within the meaning of § 
1408(3)(A) of the SMCA, because it was carrying the same type of cargo 
that a contemporary merchant ship would have.  R 8.  The court further 
found in the alternative, that if the wreck was not La Contesta, it was still 
not a sunken military craft within the meaning of the SMCA because Spain 
failed to prove that such a vessel was listed on the Royal Spanish Navy 
register.  R 8. 
Overview of the SMCA 
In 2005, as part of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year of 2005, Congress passed the 
SMCA.2  Pub. L. 108-375, div A, title XIV, § 1406(c)(2), 118 Stat 1811, 
2094 et seq.  The main purpose of the Act was to empower the United 
States to retain the “right, title, and interest” to any sunken military craft of 
the United States.  This right “(1) shall not be extinguished except by an 
express divestiture of title by the United States; and (2) shall not be 
extinguished by the passage of time, regardless of when the sunken military 
craft sank.”  Id. at §1401(1) & (2).  However, the Act also has the practical 
effect of “immunizing foreign sovereign vessels in U.S. waters from 
recovery operations and to impose an express abandonment rule tantamount 
to a claim of perpetual ownership for U.S. sunken military craft.”3  Under 
the Act, persons are prohibited from disturbing or possessing a sunken 
military craft without a permit.  Id. at §1402.  Persons found in violation of 
the Act can be assessed civil penalties of up to $100,000 a day for each 
violation and they can also be held liable for any damage resulting from 
such activities.  Id. at §§ 1404 & 1405. 
 
 2. It has been suggested that Congress enacted the SMCA under the Property Clause of 
the Constitution. U.S. CONST. Art. IV § 3, cl. 2. (stating that “Congress shall have Power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so 
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”); 
David J. Bederman, Congress Enacts Increased Protections for Sunken Military Craft, 100 
A.J. INT’L 649, 654 (2006).  
 3. See, Bederman, supra note 2, at 661-62. 
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However, for the purposes of our present case, the Act is most 
important because in § 1405, it abolishes the applicability of the Law of 
Finds and the Law of Salvage to both foreign and domestic sunken military 
craft within the waters of the United States.  Id. at § 1405(c)-(d).  
Specifically, 
 
(c) The law of finds shall not apply to- 
(1) any United States sunken military craft, wherever located; or 
(2) any foreign sunken military craft located in United States     
waters. 
(d) No salvage rights or awards shall be granted with respect to- 
(1) any United States sunken military craft without the express 
permission of the United States; or 
(2) any foreign sunken military craft located in United States 
waters without the express permission of the relevant foreign 
state. 
 
Id. at §1405(c)-(d). See Fathom Exploration, LLC v. Unidentified 
Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 352 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1227-28, n.13 
(S.D.Ala. 2005) (discussing generally the provisions of the SMCA and their 
potential applicability to all Civil War era vessels). 
Under this Act, the term “sunken military craft” is defined as all or any 
portion of “any sunken warship, naval auxiliary, or other vessel that was 
owned or operated by a government on military noncommercial service 
when it sank” and “any sunken military aircraft or military spaceship that 
was owned or operated by a government when it sank.”  Id. at §1408(3).  
Moreover, this definition also encompasses the associated contents of the 
vessels defined as “the equipment, cargo, and contents of a sunken military 
craft that are within a debris field” and “the remains of personal effects of 
the crew and passengers of a sunken military craft.”  Id. at § 1408(1).  
Finally, the Act defines the phrase “United States waters” to mean “internal 
waters, the United States territorial sea, and the United States contiguous 
zone.”  Id. at §1408(7). 
Was the wreck to which Galleon is seeking title engaged in “military 
noncommercial service”, thereby qualifying as a “sunken military 
craft” within the meaning of § 1408(3) of the SMCA? 
The first issue to be addressed is the identity of the wreck.  Is it a 
debris field, a completely unknown vessel, a Spanish commercial vessel, a 
Spanish commercial vessel carrying goods belonging to Spain, or the 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
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Spanish military frigate, La Contesta?  R 6-10. In the event the wreck is 
determined to be of Spanish origin, it must next be determined whether the 
wreck was owned by Spain, operated by Spain, or merely associated with 
Spain.  Last, parties must argue whether the vessel at the time it was sunk 
was on “military noncommercial service” within the meaning of § 1408(3) 
of the SMCA. 
The analysis of this issue is completely fact-based and turns on the 
parties’ interpretations of the significance of the artifacts recovered, 
Galleon’s description of the site, and Spain’s historical data.  In the event 
the court finds that the wreck is La Contesta, the parties should be prepared 
to argue the meaning and significance of the activities which the frigate is 
alleged to have participated in, including the significance of mail, private 
passengers, commercial goods, gold coins, and precious metals from the 
mines of Peru.  R 6-10. 
Galleon’s Argument 
Galleon will argue that the wreck in question is an unknown vessel 
whose ownership can not be determined at this time and in the alternative, 
either: a debris field, an unknown vessel, or a privately owned commercial 
vessel or a Spanish vessel that was being operated in a military commercial 
service (as opposed to military noncommercial service) at the time it sank.  
Galleon may further argue that too little about the wreck is known to make 
a determination as to whether the SMCA applies. 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain will argue that the wreck is the Spanish military frigate La 
Contesta and thus within the meaning of sunken military craft under 1408 
(3).  In the alternative, Spain will argue that if the wreck was a privately 
owned vessel, the SMCA still applies because at the time it sunk it was on 
military-non-commercial service and was being operated by the Spanish 
government.  The United States will argue that if Spain proves either the 
wreck is the Spanish military frigate La Contesta (or another Spanish naval 
vessel on military non-commercial service) or that the wreck was a 
privately owned vessel on military non commercial service operated by the 
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C.  Questions 
  
1. For Galleon: 
  
a. Based on the facts of this case, if this Court finds that the wreck was 
a privately owned commercial vessel being operated by Spain for 
military service, does the SMCA apply?  If so does it extend to the 
vessel’s cargo?  
b. How does the SMCA affect the U.S. common law doctrines of the 
Law of Salvage and the Law of Finds?  
c. What facts can you point to in the Record to support a position that   
the wreck is not in fact a wreck, but actually a debris field?  
d. What facts or factors should this Court consider in order to 
determine if the vessel was on commercial service and not on 
military noncommercial service when it sunk and thus not subject 
to SMCA or principal of sovereign immunity? 
2. For Spain and the United States: 
a. What was Congress’ intent in passing the SMCA?  
b. If this Court finds that the wreck is a Spanish vessel, then what facts 
or factors show whether the vessel was on government military 
mission or operating in a more commercial capacity?   
c. Given that too little may be known about the wreck in order for this 
Court to make a determination of ownership, what harm is there in 
allowing Galleon to continue salvage efforts so that ownership of 
the wreck can be ascertained? 
 
ISSUE II:  
WHETHER THE SHIPWRECK IS SUBJECT TO SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY AND, IF SO, DOES SALVAGE REQUIRE THE 
CONSENT OF THE SOVEREIGN. 
A.  Positions of the Parties 
Galleon argues that sovereign immunity does not apply and the 
consent of Spain is not required.  
Spain argues that sovereign immunity does apply and the consent of 
the sovereign is required.   
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
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The United States questions whether Spain has presented sufficient 
facts / evidence to show that the wreck is a Spanish vessel on military 
noncommercial service (note, the SMCA is a codification of the 
principle of sovereign immunity). 
B.  Discussion 
As discussed in Issue I, the exact nature and identity of the unknown 
wreck has not been settled, as parties will claim that the wreck is either: a 
debris field, a completely unknown vessel, a Spanish commercial vessel, a 
Spanish commercial vessel carrying goods belonging to Spain, or the 
Spanish military frigate, La Contesta.  R 7-10.  The sovereign immunity 
issue is whether Spain has a governing interest in the unknown wreck.  If it 
does, either because the wreck is the Spanish military frigate La Contesta, 
or a Spanish commercial vessel carrying goods belonging to Spain, the 
issue then becomes whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies, 
thereby requiring Galleon to obtain Spain’s consent in order to salvage the 
wreck.  If the wreck is a government vessel on government noncommercial 
service, there is also the question of whether the principle of sovereign 
immunity that covers the public vessel also extends to privately owned 
cargo and personal effects that are part of the shipwreck site. 
Here, the District Court found that the wreck belonged to Spain and 
therefore Galleon was ineligible to obtain title to the wreck under the Law 
of Finds because Spain never expressly relinquished or abandoned any 
property interests in the wreck.  R 8, 9.  Next, the court found that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity was inapplicable because the court saw no 
difference between a “sunken commercial vessel whose owners are 
insurance companies and a sunken commercial vessel being operated by a 
sovereign.”  R 10.  Therefore, the court held that Galleon was entitled to a 
salvage award in the amount of 90% of the value of the cargo recovered 
outside the GCNMS.  R 10.  However, the court further noted that Galleon 
was not entitled to a salvage award for the wreckage located within the 
GCNMS because Galleon failed to comply with both NOAA and COE 
regulations.  R 10. 
Overview of the Law of Finds 
The Law of Finds is a common law doctrine that honors “the ancient 
and honorable principle of ‘finders, keepers.’” Martha’s Vineyard Scuba 
Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 
833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987).  Historically, the Law of Finds was 
11
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solely applied to property that had never known an owner such as 
“ambergris, whales, and fish.”  Columbus-America Discovery Group v. 
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 459-60(4th Cir. 1992); see 3A 
Benedict on Admiralty § 158, at 11-15.  In modern day, the Law of Finds is 
applied in circumstances where sunken property has been abandoned by its 
previous owners or “in cases involving ancient shipwrecks where no owner 
is likely to come forward.” Massachusetts v. Maritime Underwater Surveys, 
Inc., 531 N.E.2d 549, 551 (Mass. 1988) (discussing the unlikelihood that 
descendants of pirates would come forward to claim the sunken pirate ship 
the WHYDAH); Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 461. 
In order for a finder to obtain ownership to a wreck under the Law of 
Finds, a “Plaintiff must show (1) intent to reduce property to possession, (2) 
actual or constructive possession of the property, and (3) that the property is 
either unowned or abandoned.” Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The 
Unidentified, 2006 WL 3091531, 3 (M.D.Fla. 2006). Under this framework, 
title to property obtained via the Law of Finds vests in “persons who reduce 
to their possession objects which have been abandoned at sea.”  Id.  In order 
for property to be “abandoned” specific thresholds must be met because 
“[w]hen articles are lost at sea the title of the owner in them remains.”  THE 
AKABA, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir. 1893). 
The Supreme Court has declined to address a conflict between the 
Circuits as to the definition of the term “abandon” in the context of the Law 
of Finds.  California and State Lands Commission v. Deep Sea Research, 
Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 508 (1998) (leaving the issue of the definition of 
abandonment for further reconsideration on remand).  The Circuits have 
split on the issue of an appropriate test for determining when sunken 
property is abandoned.  In R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and 
Abandoned Vessel, the Fourth Circuit held that in order for sunken property 
to be abandoned the owner must have either “expressly relinquish[ed] title” 
or in the case of ancient shipwrecks, “no owner appears in court to claim 
them.”  R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 435 
F.3d 521, 532 (4th Cir. 1992).  Conversely in Fairport International 
Exploration Inc., v. Shipwrecked Vessel, Captain Lawrence, the Sixth 
Circuit held that proof of intent of abandonment by an owner could be 
inferentially proved by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.  
Fairport International Exploration Inc., v. Shipwrecked Vessel, Captain 
Lawrence, 177 F.3d 491, 499-501 (6th Cir. 1999).  Despite the split, a 
majority of courts have held that abandonment is an affirmative act that 
requires intent on the part of the abandoning party.  See Zych v. The 
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 755 F.Supp. 213, 214 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
26.2_NELMCC_JE_MEMO 8/5/2009  12:44 AM 
2009] NELMCC JUDGES’ EDITION MEMORANDUM 553 
(N.D.Ill.1990) (holding that there is an actus element in proving intent in 
abandonment); THE PORT HUNTER, 6 F.Supp. 1009, 1011 (D.Mass. 
1934) (stating that “abandonment is said to be a voluntary act which must 
be proved by a clear and unmistakable affirmative act to indicate a purpose 
to repudiate ownership”); Hatteras, Inc. v. THE U.S.S. HATTERAS, 1984 
A.M.C. 1094, 1097 n. 5 (S.D.Tex. 1981) (finding that “[w]hile mere nonuse 
of property and lapse of time without more do not establish abandonment, 
they may, under circumstances where the owner has otherwise failed to act 
or assert any claim to property, support an inference of intent to abandon”). 
Does the Law of Finds Apply to the Unknown wreck? 
The issue here is whether the unknown wreck has been proven to 
belong to Spain.  The District Court held that Galleon was ineligible to 
obtain title to the wreck under the Law of Finds because either the vessel or 
the cargo belonged to Spain.  R 8.  The court further held that Spain had 
never expressly relinquished its property interest in the wreck, thereby 
effectively precluding Galleon from attempting to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the wreck was abandoned.  R 8.  However, in 
support of this finding, the Record only indicates that artifacts that are 
arguably of Spanish origin were recovered by Galleon and that Spanish 
ships had sunk in the general area where the unknown wreck was 
discovered.  R 8. 
Galleon’s Argument 
Galleon also will argue that the unknown wreck is not a government 
vessel.  If it is found to be a government vessel, then alternatively it will 
argue that was conducting a commercial service (as opposed to a 
government service) and thus not entitled to sovereign immunity.  Finally, 
if it is found to be a government vessel on non commercial service that is 
entitled to sovereign immunity, then it would argue that the sovereign 
immunity does not extend to privately owned cargo and personal effects. 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain and the United States also will argue that the wreck in question 
is La Contesta, a government vessel entitled to sovereign immunity.  If it is 
determined that the vessel is not a government vessel but rather a Spanish 
commercial vessel, then Spain and US will argue that it was being operated 
by the Spanish government on a government noncommercial service.  
Finally, if the court determines the vessel is not being operated by the 
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Spanish government on a noncommercial service and is not subject to the 
principle of sovereign immunity, then, Spain, as the owner of cargo and 
carried goods has the right under the Law of Salvage to deny salvage and 
any rights to an award.  The Law of Finds should not apply to property in 
which the owner is asserting its rights to its property. 
Cases Discussing the Law of Finds 
In discussing the issue of whether the unknown wreck is subject to the 
Law of Finds the following cases are helpful.  
In Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned 
Sailing Vessel, 525 F.Supp. 186 (S.D.Fla. 1981), the court did not have to 
reach the issue of abandonment because the Spanish government failed to 
appear in court and make a claim of ownership on a 1715 Spanish wreck. 
In Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned 
Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337(5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit found 
that the United States could not claim ownership to a Spanish wreck under 
the concept of sovereign prerogative.  The court found in favor of the 
plaintiff Florida corporation, the finders under the Law of Finds, stating that 
the “[d]isposition of a wrecked vessel whose very location has been lost for 
centuries as though its owner were still in existence stretches a fiction to 
absurd lengths.”  Id. 
In Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 
F.2d 450(4th Cir. 1992) a plaintiff filed suit in court seeking title to an 1857 
shipwreck and its cargo of gold under the Law of Finds.  Numerous 
underwriters proceeded to intervene claiming they had never abandoned 
their interests in the vessel, which at the time was operating as a 
commercial vessel. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that the vessel’s 
underwriters had never expressly abandoned their interest in the vessel and 
accordingly, the Law of Salvage should be applied, despite the fact that 
over 130 years had elapsed and no documentation could be found.  Id.  This 
case shows a preference to apply the Law of Salvage over the Law of Finds.  
The case also shows that admiralty maritime Law of Salvage presumes that 
there is an owner. This presumption is consistent with the courts’ 
preference for protecting property rights. 
Overview of the Principle of Sovereign Immunity 
The principle of Sovereign Immunity has origins in English common 
law where the king was immune from a suit by his subjects.  It has evolved 
into an important principle under international law of diplomacy where one 
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nation will not sue or take enforcement actions against the officers of a 
foreign government without the consent of the sovereign.  This principle 
has been extended to the embassies and vessels of foreign governments.  In 
the United States, its origins in regard to government vessels being subject 
to admiralty jurisdiction can be traced to the case of The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) (A public vessel of war of a 
foreign sovereign is exempt from the jurisdiction of the country).  Courts 
have further held that this immunity applies to the attachment of a 
sovereign’s property.  The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on 
“notions of implied consent by the territorial sovereign to exempt the 
foreign sovereign from its ‘exclusive and absolute’ jurisdiction, deriving 
from standards of public morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and 
respect for the ‘power and dignity’ of the foreign sovereign.”  National City 
Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955).  “Every 
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other 
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the 
acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”  Underhill 
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (U.S. 1897).  The doctrine of sovereign 
immunity is not absolute as exceptions can be found in cases of 
counterclaims against a sovereign and where the sovereign is acting as a 
private party.4  National City Bank of New York, 348 U.S. at 364. 
In analyzing the applicability of sovereign immunity to vessels and 
other property, courts have focused on the sovereign’s interest in the 
property and its current possession.  The Supreme Court has held that a 
foreign sovereign’s warships, as well as public vessels in its possession, 
“even though engaged in the carriage of merchandise for hire,” are immune 
from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. 
S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 570 (1926) (finding that “merchant ships owned 
[possessed] and operated by a foreign government have the same immunity 
that warships have”); The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. 116, 133-34 (1812) 
(finding that a public vessel operated by a sovereign is subject to sovereign 
immunity); The Maipo, 252 F.627 (2d Cir. 1918) (finding that a Chilean 
naval ship that was carrying commercial goods was subject to the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity).  However, the court has declined to extend this 
 
 4. On May 19, 1952, the United States formalized its position on the private acts of 
sovereigns in a letter from Acting Legal Advisor Tate to the Acting Attorney General 
Perlman (“Tate Letter”); the letter noted that “according to the newer or restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or 
public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).”  26 
Dept. State Bull 984 (1952) (discussing the “Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of 
Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments”). 
15
26.2_NELMCC_JE_MEMO 8/5/2009  12:44 AM 
556 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  26 
same protection to “vessels owned and not possessed by a foreign 
government.” Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38, (1945) 
(finding that “it is the duty of the courts, in a matter so intimately associated 
with our foreign policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to enlarge 
an immunity to an extent which the government, although often asked, has 
not seen fit to recognize”).  Although the Supreme Court has noted that “the 
judicial seizure of the property of a friendly state may be regarded as such 
an affront to its dignity and may so affect our relations with it,” that it has 
upheld the requirement that a sovereign’s property be in its possession for 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity to attach.  Republic of Mexico, 324 
U.S. at 35-36 (1945); The Fidelity, 8 F.Cas. 1189, 1191 (C.C.N.Y. 1879) 
(stating that “property does not necessarily become a part of the sovereignty 
because it is owned by the sovereign. To make it so, it must be devoted to 
the public use, and must be employed in carrying on the operations of the 
government”).  This case also provides an excellent summary of the factors 
for determining government noncommercial service.   
On February 5, 2004, in support of the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
and the SMCA, the State Department issued a public notice on the 
Protection of Sunken Warships, Military Aircraft and Other Sunken 
Government Property.  The State Department noted that it is the United 
States’ policy that disturbance or recovery of sunken state craft “should not 
occur without the express permission of the sovereign.”  69 FR 5647.  
Pursuant to this notice, the Governments of France, Germany, Japan, 
Russian Federation, Spain, and the United Kingdom submitted notice of 
their own policies toward sunken craft.  Spain articulated in their document 
that “Spain has not abandoned or otherwise relinquished its ownership or 
other interests” regarding “sunken vessels that were lost while in the service 
of the Kingdom of Spain and/or were transporting property of the Kingdom 
of Spain.”  Id.  Spain further required that the express consent of a Spanish 
representative was required before any salvage actions involving their 
property could be conducted.  Id.  Finally, Spain concluded that a sunken 
craft could only be relinquished or abandoned pursuant to a Royal Decree 
or Act of Parliament.  Id. 
Overview of the Law of Salvage 
When “sunken ships or their cargo are rescued from the bottom of the 
ocean by those other than the owners, courts favor applying the Law of 
Salvage over the Law of Finds.”  Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 
F.2d at 464-65.  The Law of Salvage is a common law doctrine that allows 
for the “right to possess another’s property and to save it from destruction, 
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danger or loss, allowing a salvor to retain it until being compensated by the 
owner. Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 
F.Supp. 953, 961 (M.D.Fla. 1993).  Therefore, 
under this law, the original owners still retain their ownership 
interests in such property, although the salvors are entitled to a very 
liberal salvage award. [which] . . . often exceed the value of the 
services rendered, and if no owner should come forward to claim the 
property, the salvor is normally awarded its total value. 
Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 459.  Moreover, courts 
have noted that the underlying purpose of the Law of Salvage is to 
“diminish the incentive for salvors to act secretly, to hide their recoveries, 
or to ward off competition from other would-be salvors.”  Id. at 460-61. 
As a precursor to a salvage claim, salvors must show that they lawfully 
acquired possession. Otherwise, as one court noted, “buccaneering would 
again flourish on the high seas.”  Lathrop, 817 F.Supp. at 963-64 (citing 
Martha’s Vineyard Scuba HQ. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 
833 F.2d 1059 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). “When Plaintiff 
obtains a permit, Plaintiff’s salvage activities and recovery of artifacts will 
be deemed lawful.” Lathrop, 817 F.Supp. at 963-64 (stating that “legislation 
which supplements admiralty jurisdiction by imposing necessary 
restrictions on salvage activities is an important legislative function 
properly reserved to Congress”). 
After possession has been established, the elements of a salvage claim 
require that a “plaintiff must show (1) a marine peril, (2) service voluntarily 
rendered, and (3) success, either wholly or partly, in recovering the 
imperiled property.” Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified, 
2006 WL 3091531, 3 (M.D.Fla.) (internal citations omitted).  With respect 
to ancient shipwrecks, courts have held that “marine peril includes more 
than the threat of storm, fire, or piracy to a vessel in navigation” and can 
include the “actions of the elements.”  Treasure Salvors, Inc., 569 F.2d at 
337; Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 460-61 (finding that 
because of the adverse nature of possession in salvage, “property may not 
be ‘salvaged’ unless it is in some form of peril”).  Moreover, “the standard 
is not whether the peril is imminent, but rather whether it is ‘reasonably to 
be apprehended.’”  Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC, 404 
F.2d 137, 139(5th Cir. 1968).  In analyzing the second element of a salvage 
claim, courts have held that salvage operations “cannot be performed 
pursuant to a preexisting duty or contract.  In other words, an individual’s 
efforts to protect a vessel from peril must be voluntary.”  U.S. v. EX-USS 
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CABOT/DEDALO, 297 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2002). In evaluating 
whether a salvage attempt is voluntary, courts are further instructed not to 
consider a salvor’s motives; “whatever motive impels the true volunteer, be 
it monetary gain, humanitarian purposes or merely error, it will not detract 
from the status accorded him by law.”  B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. U.S., 
702 F.2d 333, 338-39 (2d Cir. 1983). Therefore, professional salvors are 
entitled to salvage awards for voluntary services rendered.  The Camanche,, 
75 U.S. 448 (1869).  Lastly, the third element simply requires salvors to be 
either wholly or partly, successful in recovering the imperiled property. 
After a valid salvage claim has been established, courts are charged 
with determining the amount of any salvage awards.  Under the salvage 
award formula articulated by the Supreme Court in The Blackwall, courts 
are required to evaluate whether the following six factors have been met for 
a salvage award, 
 
(1) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage 
service; (2) The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering 
the service and saving the property; (3) The value of the property 
employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to 
which such property was exposed; (4) The risk incurred by the 
salvors in securing the property from the impending peril; (5) The 
value of the property saved; and (6) The degree of danger from 
which the property was rescued. 
 
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1869). The Fourth Circuit has presented a 
seventh potential factor, which the District Court there chose to adopt – ”the 
degree to which the salvors have worked to protect the historical and 
archeological value of the wreck and items salved.”  Columbus-America 
Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 468.  Additionally, courts have determined 
that this evaluation should be conducted on a case-by-case basis, as no 
precise formula for calculating salvage awards exists.  Allseas Maritime v. 
M/V Mimosa, 812 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1987).  However, courts are 
urged to calculate this figure truly in terms of a reward “on the notion that 
salvors should receive a bounty in order to encourage others to help vessels 
that are in distress.”  New Bedford Marine Rescue, Inc. v. Cape Jeweler’s 
Inc., 240 F.Supp.2d 101, 115 (D.Mass. 2003); see also The J.C. Pfluger, 
109 F. 93, 95 (N.D.Cal. 1901).  Moreover, salvors who voluntarily offer 
their services in a professional capacity should be entitled to greater salvage 
awards on the basis that they “possess unique skills and must maintain 
expensive equipment to continue rendering services to those in need.”  New 
Bedford Marine Rescue, 240 F.Supp.2d at 115. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
26.2_NELMCC_JE_MEMO 8/5/2009  12:44 AM 
2009] NELMCC JUDGES’ EDITION MEMORANDUM 559 
Does the Admiralty court have jurisdiction over sovereign immune 
vessels or are sovereign vessels immune from arrest under the Law of 
Salvage? If the Law of Salvage applies does it provide for a reward 
when the sovereign owner has provided advance notice that it does not 
want its shipwrecks salvaged? 
The threshold issue here is whether the vessel was on government 
noncommercial service.  If so, then the issue whether the application of the 
principle of sovereign immunity means that the vessel is immune from an 
Admiralty arrest and whether US Admiralty court therefore lacks 
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereigns shipwreck.  In determining the 
threshold issue, one factor is whether Spain’s interest in the vessel’s 
ownership and operations – does Spain’s interest reflect the interests of the 
sovereign, or does it reflect a private interest.  If Spain has retained an 
interest in the wreck because the vessel is the Spanish military frigate La 
Contesta, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable and Galleon’s 
salvage award should be denied.  Conversely, in the event the unknown 
wreck is not La Contesta, nor was it carrying property belonging to Spain, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity may not apply unless Spain can 
somehow show that the private vessel and property were charted and being 
operated for some public government mission as opposed to some private 
interest.  If the vessel and cargo are private and Spain’s interest is more of a 
private commercial interest rather than public government service then the 
principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, and neither does Spain’s 
notice about denying salvage to its sovereign immune vessels.  In that case, 
Galleon’s salvage award should be upheld. 
Another question that arises is: If the unknown wreck is a Spanish 
commercial vessel carrying goods belonging to Spain, does sovereign 
immunity attach to the ship? To the cargo? Or, to both? 
Another question is if the vessel is a Spanish government vessel 
subject to sovereign immunity, does that make any private cargo and 
personal effects immune from arrest under Admiralty maritime law of 
salvage or otherwise not subject to Admiralty jurisdiction of U.S. Admiralty 
court.  Doesn’t the notice by Government of Spain regarding salvage of 
sovereign immune vessels preclude the award of salvage rights to recovery 
of private cargo and personal effects associate with the sovereign immune 
vessel? 
Please note that the parties may also decide to address under the Law 
of Salvage whether Galleon’s possession of the shipwreck was lawful as a 
necessary threshold to a salvage claim; whether the unknown wreck was 
19
26.2_NELMCC_JE_MEMO 8/5/2009  12:44 AM 
560 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  26 
truly in marine peril; whether Galleon’s services were rendered voluntarily; 
and whether Galleon’s salvage award met the requisite factors for an award. 
Galleon’s Argument 
Galleon will argue that the unknown wreck either does not belong to 
Spain, or is a Spanish commercial vessel that was not being operated by 
Spain on a government noncommercial service mission.  It will also argue 
that it was not carrying goods belonging to Spain.  If the wreck is found to 
be a Spanish commercial vessel carrying goods belonging to Spain, Galleon 
will argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply when 
sovereigns are acting with the interests of private parties. 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain will argue that if the unknown wreck is found to be either La 
Contesta or a Spanish commercial vessel on government noncommercial 
service, then the doctrine of sovereign immunity will apply to both the 
wreck and the cargo.  Spain will argue that Galleon was on notice that 
Spain didn’t want its sunken vessels salvaged and that Galleon was required 
to obtain Spain’s consent before it initiated its salvage operations.  Galleon 
therefore should be denied any award and ordered to return the salvaged 
artifacts to the government of Spain. 
The United States will argue that if the wreck is La Contesta, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity applies and Galleon was required to obtain 
Spain’s consent before initiating its salvage operations.  The United States 
will also question whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies in the 
event that the wreck is found to be a commercial vessel carrying goods 
belonging to Spain.  This is because in the United States, in order for a 
sovereign’s property to be eligible for sovereign immunity, courts have 
required that the property must have been used by the government for some 
governmental public purpose as opposed to a more private commercial 
purpose. 
 
Cases Discussing the Issues of Sovereign Immunity and the 
Law of Salvage 
In discussing whether the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity applies to 
the Law of Salvage, the following cases are helpful.  
In California and State Lands Commission v. Deep Sea Research, Inc. 
et. al., 523 U.S. 421 (U.S. 1998), Deep Sea Research (“DSR”) located, 
within the territorial waters of California, the remains of the SS Brother 
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Jonathon which was carrying an estimated $2,000,000 in gold at the time of 
its sinking in July 1865.  DSR sought either title to the vessel under the Law 
of Finds or a liberal salvage award under the Law of Salvage.  California 
intervened arguing it had colorable title to the SS Jonathon under both the 
Submerged Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq.) and the Abandoned 
Shipwreck Act (43 U.S.C. § 2101 et. seq.).  California further claimed that 
DSR’s in rem admiralty action was an action against the State in violation 
of the Eleventh Amendment (State Immunity from US Federal Court 
without consent) The District Court found that California failed to 
demonstrate a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan under federal law 
and the Ninth Circuit held that California failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it had colorable title to the wreck.  The 
Supreme Court held that the 11th Amendment does not bar a federal court’s 
jurisdiction over an in rem admiralty action where the res is not within the 
State’s possession.  It distinguished its prior holding in Florida Department 
of State v. Treasure Salvors Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (U.S. 1982) (federal courts 
are barred from adjudicating State’s title to property without the consent of 
the State) and took a more “nuanced” approach because DSR asserted rights 
to a res that was not in the possession of the State.  The Supreme Court also 
overturned the District Court’s holding that the wreck was not abandoned 
and noted that a rehearing of that issue may also address the issue of 
preemption.  Note: only if the lower court found that the shipwreck was 
abandoned would it possibly address the issue of preemption.  In the 
context of this case, if the sovereign immunity of the several States of the 
US in the case of the Brother Jonathan is determined to be analogous to the 
sovereign immunity of the Spanish Government, then it could be argued 
that the principle of sovereign immunity under international law does not 
bar US federal court adjudication of Spain’s title in an in rem admiralty 
action where the sovereign lacks possession of the subject res. 
In Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 
F.3d 634 (4th Cir. 2000), Spain intervened in an admiralty suit by plaintiff 
salvors.  At issue was whether Spain had abandoned its claims to two 
vessels that sank off the coast of Virginia. The LA GALGA, a Spanish 
frigate served as a convoy ship at the time of its sinking and the JUNO a 
frigate, was carrying military personnel and their families when it sank.  
The Fourth Circuit found that both LA GALGA and JUNO, as sovereign 
vessels of Spain, are covered by the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General 
Relations between the United States and Spain.  Under the terms of this 
1902 treaty, Spanish vessels, like those belonging to the United States, may 
only be abandoned by express acts. The Fourth Circuit found that Sea Hunt 
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cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that the Kingdom of Spain 
had expressly abandoned these ships either in the 1763 Definitive Treaty of 
Peace Between Great Britain, France and Spain or the 1819 Treaty of 
Amity, Settlement and Limits.  Id. at 638.  The Fourth Circuit noted “[t]he 
State Department has likewise emphasized that its policy is ‘to recognize 
claims by foreign governments-such as in this case by the Government of 
Spain regarding the warships JUNO and LA GALGA-to ownership of 
foreign warships sunk in waters of the United States without being 
captured, and to recognize that title to such sunken warships is not lost 
absent express abandonment by the sovereign’ Statement of Interest, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, ¶ 9” (emphasis in the original). Id. at 643.  Because “U.S. 
domestic law is consistent with the customary international law rule that 
title to sunken warships may be abandoned only by an express act of 
abandonment” Id., the Fourth Circuit held both LA  GALGA and JUNO 
remain the property of Spain. 
In International Aircraft Recovery L.L.C. v. Unidentified Wrecked and 
Abandoned Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit 
found that the United States Navy did not abandon its interests in a Navy 
torpedo bomber when it struck that bomber from its inventory of active 
planes after the bomber crashed in international waters during World War 
II. The Eleventh Circuit further held that the United States, as owner of the 
bomber, could prohibit salvage efforts and International Aircraft Recovery 
L.L.C. had no right to continue its salvage operations over the express 
objections of the United States. 
In The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116 (1812), an 
action by United States citizens to recover a vessel seized by the French 
government that had been returned to United States waters, the Supreme 
Court outlined the foundational principals of sovereign immunity in finding 
that sovereigns, as well as their attached property, are immune from suit in 
United States courts unless they consent.  Id.  The court noted that the 
doctrine should be applied narrowly to interests involving a sovereign’s 
power, and not to private property belonging to a sovereign.  Id.  Ultimately 
the court found that the vessel at issue was a “ship of war” and could not be 
attached. 
In Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) the Supreme 
Court decided a libel in rem case for contract damages against the Italian 
steamship the Pesraro.  In that case, the Court addressed the issue of  
“whether a ship owned and possessed by a foreign government, and 
operated by it in the carriage of merchandise for hire, is immune from 
arrest” under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Id. at 611.  The 
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commercial vessel at issue was owned and possessed by the Italian 
government and was commissioned for the purpose of carrying private 
party goods between Italy and New York.  The Court held that because the 
vessel was owned and possessed by the Italian government, it was entitled 
to immunity as a vessel used for a “public purpose.”  Id. 
In The Maipo, 252 F.627 (2d Cir. 1918) the court found that a Chilean 
naval ship operated by naval personnel was subject to the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, even though it had been chartered by a private party 
and was carrying commercial goods. 
 
C.  Questions 
 
1. For Galleon: 
  
a. Can you please briefly explain the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
its purpose and why it should not be applied in this case?  
b. Why should the Law of Finds or the Law of Salvage be applied in 
this case if we find that that the wreck was a Spanish vessel?   
c. The governments argue that marine peril associated with a recent 
marine casualty passed many years ago and that the wreck is now a 
relative state of stability.  Can you explain why the court should 
find the wreck was in “marine peril” such as to entitle you to an 
award under the Law of Salvage?  Please articulate the standard for 
evaluating marine peril of a wreck that has been underwater for 
centuries.  
d. A necessary precursor to asserting a salvage claim is lawful 
possession.  Was Galleon’s possession in this case lawful?  
e. In the event this Court finds that the wreck is either a debris field, or 
an unknown wreck and the Law of Salvage applies, is your claim 
here mooted by the Abandoned Shipwreck Act? 
2. For Spain and the United States: 
a. Explain what the principle of sovereign immunity is, what its 
underlying purpose is, and why it should be applied in this case?  
What does its application in this case accomplish in light of its 
public purpose?  
23
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b. In what circumstances, if any, should courts apply the Law of Finds 
and the Law of Salvage to shipwrecks subject to sovereign 
immunity?  
c. Does the doctrine of sovereign immunity extend to a sovereign’s 
property?  Does it extend to private property that is on the public 
vessel?  Does the Government have the right to deny owners of 
private property from salvaging their property from a sovereign 
immune vessel without the prior consent of the sovereign?  
d. How, if any, does possession by the sovereign affect the analysis of 
whether sovereign immunity attaches to a sovereign’s property? 
 
ISSUE III:  
WHETHER NOAA WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN 
DENYING GALLEON A RESEARCH AND RECOVERY PERMIT 
FOR ITS ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE GCNMS.5 
A.  Positions of the Parties 
Galleon argues that NOAA was arbitrary and capricious in denying it a    
 permit.  
Spain argues that the permit was properly denied and that a permit    
 cannot be issued without its consent.  
The United States argues the permit was properly denied. 
B.  Discussion 
In April 2008, after its initial discoveries, Galleon applied to NOAA to 
obtain a Research and Recovery Permit in order to continue its excavation 
of the remaining wreck and cargo located within the boundary of the 
GCNMS.  R 6.  Upon review of its application, NOAA denied Galleon’s 
permit on the basis that Galleon had not obtained the authorization of the 
owner of the ship in order to initiate a salvage operation.  R 6.  In its denial, 
NOAA found that Galleon had arguably discovered the remains of a 
Spanish vessel and that in order to commence salvage operations, Galleon 
 
 5. The Record calls this permit a “salvage and recovery permit,” however this was done 
before parties were instructed to apply the sanctuary regulations applicable to the Florida 
Keys National Marine Sanctuary for clarification purposes which were posted on the 
NELMCC website, Questions about Official Rules and Moot Problem, #28. 
http:www.pace.edu/page.cfm?docid=32381 (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). 
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needed to include documentation of Spain’s express approval of the salvage 
operation before NOAA could issue the permit.  R 6.  In addition, NOAA 
noted that Galleon failed to provide any documentation illustrating that the 
wreck was anything other than a Spanish vessel.  R 12. 
In its October 15, 2008 Order, the District Court held that NOAA did 
not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied Galleon’s permit for its 
excavation activities within the GCNMS because the court found that 
Galleon failed to obtain the consent of Spain, or in the alternative, failed to 
show that the wreck belonged to a country other than Spain.  R 11.  
However, when Galleon contacted Spain to obtain authorization, Spain 
refused to grant permission to excavate the wreck.  R 6.  First, Spain stated 
that the wreck was La Contesta – a ship that was an example of the most 
sophisticated technology of its time – and that Galleon’s salvage operation 
would destroy the scientific and historical integrity of the wreck.  R 6.  
Second, Spain claimed that the artifacts aboard the vessel (aside from the 
coins and bullion) were historic examples of the type of trade that Spain and 
the Incan Empire dealt in, and that the wreck was of tremendous 
archaeological value.  R 6.  Third, Spain denied Galleon’s request because 
Galleon had not proven to Spain’s satisfaction that they would conduct their 
excavation in accordance with the UNESCO Convention on the Protection 
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (“CPUCH”), Nov. 2, 2001. 6  R 6.  
Finally, Spain argued that La Contesta may be the final resting place of 
unknown numbers of Spanish military personnel and that Galleon’s 
excavation would inevitably disturb their graves.  R 4. 
The Arbitrary & Capricious Standard of Review 
Appeals from administrative agency decisions are governed by § 706 
of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006); see 
e.g., Environmental Information Center v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 
1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) (ESA agency actions are subject to judicial 
review under § 706 of the APA).  Under the APA § 706 an administrative 
agency’s decision can be set aside in the event a court finds that the 
agency’s action was “‘arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise nor in accordance with law” or “without observance of procedure 
required by law.’”  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (2006); NRDC v. Houston, 146 
F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998).  Under § 702 of the APA this standard of 
 
 6. Ratification by Saint Lucia of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=36854&URL_DO=DO_TOPI 
C&URL_SECTION=201.html (Paris, 2 Nov. 2001) (last visited Nov. 28, 2008). 
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review applies to all forms of agency decisions including failing to approve 
a permit.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
Courts generally defer to agency decisions under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review, because the “standard is narrow and a court 
is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”  Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (discussing an agency decision made by the 
Department of Transportation).  In addition, the Supreme Court has stated 
that a decision should not be vacated unless the agency has 
relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, 
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 
Id.  There must be a “rational connection” between the relevant facts 
considered and the agency’s decision.  Burlington Truck Lines v. U.S., 156, 
168 (1962); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971).  “Decision[s] of less than ideal clarity [will be upheld] if the 
agency’s path may be reasonably discerned.”  Bowman Transp., Inc. v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974).  In addition, 
courts are instructed not to supply a “reasonable basis” for the agency’s 
action when they themselves have not provided one.  SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).  In the event an agency’s decision is found 
to be arbitrary and capricious, the appropriate remedy is to remand the 
decision to the agency for further clarification of its reasoning.  Gonzales v. 
Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006). 
Overview of the NMSA 
For a discussion of the NMSA including the standards for Research 
and Recovery Permits, please see Issue IV at 22-23. 
Was NOAA arbitrary and capricious in denying Galleon a research 
and recovery permit for its activities within the GCNMS? 
Galleon’s Argument 
Galleon will first argue that the unknown wreck was either: a debris 
field, a wreck of unknown origin, or a Spanish vessel that was carrying 
private cargo.  Accordingly, Galleon will maintain that it did not need to 
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obtain Spain’s consent because the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not 
apply to what Galleon found.  Galleon will then defend its actions within 
the GSNMS by claiming that NOAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
requiring it to obtain consent from a non-owner – the Kingdom of Spain, 
and, in the absence of such consent, summarily denying its permit request. 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain and the United States will argue that the unknown wreck is 
either a Spanish vessel carrying goods belonging to Spain or the Spanish 
military frigate, La Contesta; NOAA properly denied Galleon’s permit 
request because Galleon had not obtained prior consent from the Kingdom 
of Spain as required by NOAA. 
 
C.  Questions 
  
1. For Galleon: 
  
a. What is the purpose of a Research and Recovery Permit?  
b. What is the standard of review for a federal agency’s denial of a 
permit?  
c. Did NOAA improperly consider the ownership of the wreck in 
determining whether to grant Galleon’s permit? 
2. For Spain and the United States: 
a.  What factors should this Court should be looking at in order to 
determining whether the NOAA acted arbitrary and capriciously in 
denying Galleon’s permit?  
b. If the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies here, was Galleon 
required to obtain Spain’s consent before receiving a permit?  
c.  Aside from the issue of sovereign immunity, are there any other 
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ISSUE IV:  
WHETHER A NMSA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR THE WRECK 
AND THE CARGO IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THAT CARGO 
LIES WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE GCNMS. 
A.  Positions of the Parties 
Galleon argues that a NMSA permit was not required for its salvage 
operations.  
Spain argues that a NMSA permit was required and that a permit 
cannot be issued without its consent.  
The United States argues that a NMSA permit was required. 
B.  Discussion 
Previously, the United States has argued that because the unknown 
wreck is a single archaeological site, NOAA’s jurisdiction should extend 
outside of the boundaries of the GCNMS in order to effectively manage the 
site.  R 12.  In response, the District Court in its October 15, 2008 Order, 
found that to uphold the United States’ position would place a “great 
burden upon Galleon.”  R 12.  The District Court found that the United 
States’ jurisdiction only extended within the boundaries of the GCNMS and 
that Galleon was free to assert claims under the Laws of Salvage and Finds 
for the parts of the wreck and cargo found outside the GCNMS.  R 12.  
Moreover, the court went on to distinguish the facts of this case from the 
facts in Columbus-America Discovery Group, finding that the court’s 
decision to treat both privately owned cargo and cargo owned by insurance 
carriers as one for the purposes of calculating a salvage award was 
dispositive.  Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 
974 F.2d 450, 459-60(4th Cir. 1992).  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
determined that Galleon was entitled to a salvage award in the amount of 
90% of the value of the cargo that it recovered outside the boundaries of the 
GCNMS because Galleon acted on behalf of Spain to save its property, 
even if Spain as an owner did not make a salvage request.  R 13.  However, 
the court held that Galleon was not entitled to a salvage award for the 
wreckage located within the GCNMS because Galleon failed to comply 
with both NOAA and COE regulations.  R 13. 
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Overview of the NMSA 
The NMSA was passed in order to designate and manage marine 
sanctuaries within the waters of the United States for the purpose of 
preserving the United States’ underwater, natural, and cultural resources.  
16 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006).  Congress described its underlying purpose in 
passing the Act as to prevent the “thoughtless utilization of the oceans,” 117 
Cong. Rec. 30,855 (1971) (quoting Representative Mosher), and “to assure 
the preservation of our coastal areas and fisheries.”7 117 Cong. Rec. 30,858 
(1971) (quoting Representative Keith). Although the NMSA names the 
Secretary of Commerce as the Administrator of the Act, the Secretary 
instead chose to delegate his authority under the NMSA to NOAA.  39 Fed. 
Reg. 10,255 (1974).  Moreover, under the NMSA, NOAA has broad author-
ity as it, “may designate any discrete area of the marine environment as a 
national marine sanctuary and promulgate regulations implementing the 
designation.” 16 U.S.C.A. § 1433(a) (2006).  Pursuant to this authority, 
NOAA has promulgated both general applicability and marine sanctuary 
specific regulations.  15 C.F.R. § 922 (2008).  For the purposes of this case, 
the sanctuary specific regulations of the Florida Keys National Marine 
Sanctuary apply.8  15 C.F.R. § 922.160 (2008). 
The basic prohibition of the NMSA makes it unlawful for any person 
to 1) “destroy, cause the loss of, or injure any sanctuary resource,” 2) 
“possess, sell, offer for sale, purchase, import, export, deliver, carry, 
transport, or ship by any means any sanctuary resource,” or 3) to interfere 
with any law enforcement efforts, without first obtaining a permit. 16 
U.S.C. § 1436(1)-(4) (2006).  For the purpose of this section, “sanctuary 
resource,” means “any living or nonliving resource of a national marine 
sanctuary that contributes to the conservation, recreational, ecological, 
historical, educational, cultural, archeological, scientific, or aesthetic value 
of the sanctuary.”  16 U.S.C. § 1432(8) (2006).  The courts have extended 
the definition of “sanctuary resource” to include seagrasses.  U.S. Fisher, 
977 F.Supp. 1193 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that seagrass is a “resource” 
within the definition of the NMSA).  However, NOAA may issue permits, 
 
 7. For a discussion of the legislative history and the effectiveness of the NMSA. See, 
Dave Owen, The Disappointing History of the National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 11 N.Y.U. 
Envtl. L.J. 711, 716 -17 (2003). 
 8. The regulations specific to the fictitious GCNMS were not initially disclosed in the 
Record, however, parties were instructed to apply the sanctuary regulations applicable to the 
Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary for clarification purposes which was posted on the 
NELMCC website, Questions about Official Rules and Moot Problem, #28. http://www.pace 
.edu/page.cfm?docid=32381 (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). 
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authorizing these prohibited activities within a marine sanctuary in the 
event it deems the conduct necessary “(1) to establish conditions of access 
to and use of any sanctuary resource; or (2) to promote public use and 
understanding of a sanctuary resource.” 16 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(1)-(2) (2006).  
Permits may only be issued if the Administrator determines that a given 
activity is “compatible with the purposes for which the sanctuary is 
designated and with protection of sanctuary resources” and is carried out 
“in a manner that does not destroy, cause the loss of, or injure sanctuary 
resources.”  16 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1) & (3) (2006).  Permits issued under this 
section are only valid for a period of years, and permittees are required to 
carry liability insurance or post a bond for their activities.  16 U.S.C. §§ 
1441(c)(2) & (4) (2006).  Lastly, a sanctuary can “amend, suspend or 
revoke a permit for good cause.”  15 C.F.R. § 922.166(g) (2008).  The 
sanctuary “may deny a permit application, in whole or in part, if it is 
determined that the permittee or applicant has acted in violation of a 
previous permit, of these regulations, of the NMSA or [GCNMS], or for 
other good cause.”  15 C.F.R. § 922.166(g) (2008).  An appeal procedure is 
available for denied permits pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 922.50 2008).  15 
C.F.R. § 922.166(h) (2008). 
Under the specific regulations applicable to the GCNMS, four 
different types of permits can be issued to applicants: a General Permit, a 
Survey/Inventory of Historical Resources Permit, a Research/Recovery of 
Sanctuary Historical Resources Permit, and a Special-Use Permit. 15 C.F.R. 
§§ 922.166(a)-(d) (2008).  In this case, however, Galleon did not apply for a 
permit. 
(a) General Permit. 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(a) (2008). 
A General Permit can be issued to allow any of the prohibitions listed 
in §§ 922.163 & 922.164, except where another permit is applicable.  15 
C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(1) (2008).  A general permit can be issued for the 
following activities relevant in this case: 1) the removal of, or injury to, or 
possession of living or dead coral,9 15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(2) & (2)(i) 
(2008); 2) the “drilling into, dredging, or otherwise altering the seabed of 
the Sanctuary, or engaging in prop-dredging,” 15 C.F.R. § 922.163(3) 
(2008); 3) “discharging or depositing, from within the boundary of the 
Sanctuary, any material or other matter,” 15 C.F.R. § 922.163(4)(i) (2008); 
 
 9. There is also a prohibition against takings in the NMSA, however, corals are carved 
out as a distinct group subject to their own regulations.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(a)(10) (2008); 
15 C.F.R. § 922.162 (2008) 
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and 4) “discharging or depositing, from beyond the boundary of the 
Sanctuary, any material or other matter that subsequently enters the 
Sanctuary and injures a Sanctuary resource.” 15 C.F.R. § 922.163(4)(ii) 
(2008).  Here the term “prop dredging” means “the use of propulsion wash 
deflectors or similar means of dredging or otherwise altering the seabed of 
the Sanctuary.” 15 C.F.R. § 922.162 (2008).  Moreover the term, “injure” 
means “to change adversely, either in the short or long term, a chemical, 
biological or physical attribute of, or the viability of. This includes, but is 
not limited to, to cause the loss of or destroy.”  15 C.F.R. § 922.3 (2008). 
The prohibitions against “moving, removing, injuring, or possessing, 
or attempting to move, remove, injure, or possess, a Sanctuary historical 
resource,” are allowed via the following permits.  15 C.F.R. § 922.163(9) 
(2008). 
(b) Survey/Inventory of Historical Resources Permit.  
 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(b) (2008). 
A Survey Permit is issued when an applicant is seeking to conduct 
historical survey or inventory activities that “will involve test excavations 
or removal of artifacts or materials for evaluative purposes.”  15 C.F.R. § 
922.166(b)(1) (2008).  Conversely, a Survey Permit is not required when a 
party engages in activities “that are non-intrusive, do not include any 
excavation, removal, or recovery of historical resources, and do not result in 
destruction of, loss of, or injury to Sanctuary resources.”  15 C.F.R. § 
922.166(b)(1) (2008). 
(c) Research/Recovery of Sanctuary Historical Resources 
Permit. 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(c) (2008). 
A Research/ Recover Permit may be issued by the sanctuary if the 
applicant is: 1) “professionally qualified” perform and complete the work, 
15 C.F.R. § 922.166(a)(3)(i) (2008); 2) “has adequate financial resources” 
to complete the work, 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(a)(3)(ii) (2008); 3) that the 
duration of the project is sufficient to complete the work, 15 C.F.R. § 
922.166(a)(3)(iii) (2008); 4) that the “methods and procedures” proposed 
are appropriate to achieve the goal of the project, 15 C.F.R. § 
922.166(a)(3)(iv) (2008); 5) that the permitted activity will be “conducted 
in a manner compatible with the primary objective of protection of 
Sanctuary resources and qualities,” 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(a)(3)(v)(2008); 6) 
the project is necessary for the applicant to achieve its goals, 15 C.F.R. § 
922.166(a)(3)(vi) (2008); and 7) the “reasonably expected end value of the 
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activity . . . outweighs any potential adverse impacts on Sanctuary resources 
and qualities.” 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(a)(3)(vii) (2008); 15 C.F.R. § 922. 
166(2)(i) (2008). 
After these preliminary issues have been addressed, a permit will only 
be issued if 1) “the recovery of the resource is in the public interest as 
described in the SCR Agreement,” 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(2)(ii) (2008); 2) 
“Recovery of the resource is part of research to preserve historic 
information for public use,” 15 C.F.R. § 922.166(2)(iii) (2008), and 3) 
“recovery of the resource is necessary or appropriate to protect the resource, 
preserve historical information, and/or further the policies and purposes of 
the NMSA and the [GCNMS],” and will be conducted in accordance with 
the conditions of the SCR Agreement.  15 C.F.R. § 922.166(2)(iv) (2008). 
(d) Special-Use Permit.  15 C.F.R. § 922.166(d) (2008). 
A Special- use Permit applies to situations where a person is seeking to 
conduct “commercial or concession-type activit[ies]” for the purpose of 
“deaccess[ing]/transfer[ing] [ ] Sanctuary historical resources.”  15 C.F.R. § 
922.166(d)(2) (2008).  Under this section permits cannot be issued unless 
the conduct “is compatible with the purposes for which the Sanctuary was 
designated and can be conducted in a manner that does not destroy, cause 
the loss of, or injure any Sanctuary resource.”  Id.  These types of activities 
allowed by the permit must also conform with all the requirements of the 
Programmatic Agreement for the Management of Submerged Cultural 
Resources in the [GCNMS] among NOAA, the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation, and the State of Florida (“SCR”).  Id.  In issuing a 
Special-use permit, a sanctuary may also assess fees.  15 C.F.R. § 
922.166(d)(3) (2008). 
Did Galleon have to apply for an NMSA permit for the wreck and 
cargo lying within the boundaries of the GCNMS? 
The issue here is not whether Galleon should have applied for an 
NMSA permit, but rather, did Galleon engage in any prohibited activities 
for which it should have obtained a NMSA permit.  Ultimately, because 
Galleon’s activities seem to fall squarely into the prohibited actions for 
which permits are required under the Act, Galleon will most probably have 
to concede that a permit was required for its activities within the GCNMS.  
However, Galleon will defend its actions by claiming that NOAA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying its permit. The analysis in this 
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section solely requires applying the facts of the case to the various 
permitting schemes discussed above. 
Galleon’s Argument 
Galleon will first argue that the unknown wreck was either a debris 
field, a wreck of unknown origin, or a Spanish vessel that was not carrying 
goods belonging to Spain, and therefore it did not need to obtain Spain’s 
consent because the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply. 
Galleon will then defend its actions within the GSNMS by claiming that 
NOAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying their permit. 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain and the United States will argue that Galleon was potentially 
eligible for multiple NMSA permits for its activities within the GCNMS.  
Among the potential permits are a Survey Permit for Galleon’s initial 
explorations, a Special-use Permit for removing artifacts from the 
sanctuary, and a General Permit for its drilling and prop-dredging activities, 
for its destruction of coral, and for its discharges within the GCNMS.  In 
addition, Spain will argue that the unknown wreck is either a Spanish vessel 
carrying goods belonging to Spain or the Spanish military frigate, La 
Contesta, and therefore Galleon is required to obtain Spain’s consent under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity before NOAA can issue Galleon a 
permit for its activities within the GCNMS.10 
Did Galleon have to apply for a NMSA permit for the wreck and 
cargo lying outside the boundaries of the GCNMS? 
Generally, Galleon’s activities outside the GCNMS would not require 
Galleon to apply for an NMSA permit.  However, in the event Galleon’s 
activities generated a discharge that flowed into the sanctuary from non-
sanctuary lands, Galleon would have been required to obtain a General 
Permit under the exception in 15 C.F.R. §922.163(a)(4)(ii) (2008), if the 
discharge “injured” any sanctuary resources.  As such, in order to determine 
whether Galleon’s activities would be subject to this exception, parties will 
first have to argue whether the nature of Galleon’s drilling and mailboxing 
activities would cause a discharge to flow into the Sanctuary.  Second, 
parties will have to argue whether the discharge injured a sanctuary 
 
 10. For a discussion of the applicability of sovereign immunity please see supra Issue II 
at 11-12. 
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resource within the meaning the Act thereby requiring Galleon to obtain a 
permit. 
Galleon’s Argument 
Galleon will argue that its mailboxing activities did not cause a 
discharge within the meaning of the NMSA.  In the alternative, Galleon will 
argue that if a discharge did flow into the sanctuary from its activities, it 
still would not have to obtain a permit for its extra-sanctuary activities 
because the discharge did not injure a sanctuary resource. 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain and the United States will both argue that Galleon’s mailboxing 
activities created a discharge that flowed into the sanctuary and ultimately 
injured sanctuary resources.  Spain will additionally argue that in issuing a 
permit, NOAA properly required Galleon to obtain Spain’s consent for its 




1. For Galleon: 
  
a. What are the different kinds of permits that Galleon could be 
eligible for under the NMSA?  
b. Does Galleon’s use of prop-wash deflectors constitute a discharge 
under the NMSA?  
c. If Galleon is found to have discharged rocks and debris from outside 
the GCNMS, onto the endangered Johnson seagrasses inside the 
GCNMS, effectively covering them, should Galleon have obtained 
a permit for its activities? 
2. For Spain and the United States: 
a. What is the purpose and scope of the NMSA?  
b. Was Galleon required to obtain an NMSA permit for any of the 
activities it conducted within the boundaries of the Marine 
Sanctuary?  
 
 11. For a discussion of the applicability of sovereign immunity please see supra Issue II 
at 11-12. 
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c. If this Court finds that a discharge from Galleon’s activities outside 
the GCNMS, flowed onto the sanctuary floor, would Galleon be 
required to obtain a permit from NOAA for this activity? 
 
ISSUE V:  
WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE ACTED 
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN HE DENIED 
GALLEON AN ENDANGERED SPECIES PERMIT TO DRILL 
THROUGH THE ENDANGERED DEEP SEA CORAL. 
A.  Positions of the Parties 
Galleon argues that the Secretary of Commerce acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously when it denied the company an ESA permit.  
Spain argues that the ESA permit was properly denied.  
The United States argues that the ESA permit was properly denied. 
B.  Discussion 
At some point prior to Galleon’s suit, presumably after Galleon 
completed its preliminary excavations, Galleon applied for an ESA 
incidental take permit.12  The Secretary of Commerce subsequently denied 
Galleon’s application.  R 13.  In its October 15, 2008 Order, the District 
Court addressed this issue and held that the Secretary of Commerce did not 
act arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied Galleon an incidental take 
permit.  R 13.  Specifically, the court found that Galleon’s excavation 
activities harmed both the endangered deep sea coral and the endangered 
Johnson seagrasses species thereby causing an overall degradation of their 
habitat in the GCNMS, because 1) Galleon’s drilling techniques 
“destroy[ed] or degrade[d] the deep sea coral,” and 2) Galleon’s mailbox 
activities additionally destroyed Johnson seagrasses.  R 13. 
The Arbitrary & Capricious Standard of Review 
For a discussion of the arbitrary and capricious standard as it relates to 
administrative agency decisions please see supra Issue III at 18-19. 
 
 12. The nature of the permit Galleon applied for under the ESA was not initially 
disclosed in the Record but was added for clarification purposes and posted on the NELMCC 
website, Questions about Official Rules and Moot Problem, #18 & #24. http://www.pace.edu 
/page.cfm?doc_id=32381 (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). 
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Overview of the ESA 
The ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq., was passed to specifically 
provide for the “conservation, protection and propagation of endangered 
species of fish and wildlife.”13  SR No. 93-307, US Code Cong & Adm 
News 2989 (1973).  Congress entrusted enforcement of the Act to the Fish 
and Wildlife Service under the Department of the Interior and to the 
National Marine Fisheries Service under the Department of Commerce 
depending on the duties and responsibilities assigned to each.14  16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1542(1) & (2) (2006); 16 U.S.C § 1532(10) (2006).  In its definition 
section, the Act identifies “endangered species” to mean “any species which 
is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(4) (2006).  The definition of “species” includes 
“any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(11) (2006).  
Therefore, under the facts of this case, Johnson seagrasses qualify as plants 
however, it is unknown whether the endangered deep sea coral15 will 
qualify under the “fish and wildlife” provision.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5) & (9) 
(2006).  Here, ESA regulations define “coral (live),” with respect to the 
prohibitions section, as “pieces of coral that are alive.”  50 C.F.R. § 23.5 
(2008).  The Endangered Species List classifies “coral” as its own separate 
category. 50 C.F.R. Part 223 (2006).  This contrasts sharply with common 
principles of biology that classify coral as a microscopic marine animal.16 
The prohibition section of the ESA, Section 9, makes it unlawful for 
any “person,” defined as “any individual, corporation, partnership, trust” or 
any other private or governmental agency or agent, to engage in any of the 
prohibited activities defined in the Act.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(8) (2006).  For 
endangered species of fish or wildlife, Section 9 prohibits the “tak[ing] [of 
an endangered species of fish or wildlife] within the United States or the 
 
 13. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 is inapplicable in this case because no 
marine mammals are involved.  16 U.S.C. § 1543 (2006) (stating “no provision of this Act 
[ESA] shall take precedence over any more restrictive conflicting provision of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 [16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (2006)].” 
 14. NOAA has been delegated jurisdiction over the listing of endangered and threatened 
marine species pursuant to 50 C.F.R. Pt. 17 (2007) (stating that jurisdiction for listing such 
species as coral was delegated to NOAA). 
 15. Even though in real life coral is listed as a “threatened” species under the ESA, for 
purposes of this problem participants have been instructed to treat the deep sea coral as 
“endangered.” NELMCC website, Questions about Official Rules and Moot Problem, #30. 
http://www.pace.edu/page.cfm?doc_id=32381 (last visited Nov. 7, 2008). 
 16. See, National Geographic, http://animals.nationalgeographic.com/animals 
/invertebrates/coral.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2008) (classifying corals as “tiny, soft-bodied 
organisms [translucent animals] related to sea anemones and jellyfish.” 
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territorial sea of the United States,” 16 U.S.C. § 1538(1)(B) (2006).17  Here 
“take” is defined as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”  16 U.S.C. 
§ 1532(14) (2006).  Whereas “harm” within the context of the “take” 
definition, 
 
means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may 
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it 
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering. 
  
50 C.F.R. 17.3 (2008). 
With respect to endangered plants, Section 9 of the Act also prohibits 
persons from maliciously damaging or destroying any endangered plant 
species or knowingly “remov[ing], cut[ting], dig[ing] up, or damag[ing] or 
destroy[ing] any such [plant] species” from federal land or from “other” 
lands if it violates state criminal trespass laws.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(2)(B) 
(2006); Northern California River Watch v. Wilcox, 547 F.Supp.2d 1071, 
1074-75 (N.D.Cal. 2008). While there is no incidental take permit provision 
in Section 10 of the ESA for endangered plants, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B), 
the question still arises whether Galleon’s activities constituted a prohibited 
“take” of endangered plants.  R 13.  
When interpreting the prohibitions of Section 9 of the ESA, courts 
have held that the prohibition against the taking of an endangered species 
under 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006) is absolute, and not allowable without 
a permit.  Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 614 (Minn. 1985) (finding a 
government regulation allowing seasonal hunting of the eastern timber 
wolf, a threatened species, to be beyond the authority given the agency by 
Congress).  Moreover, courts have further held that a “taking” need not be 
intentional and that negligence that results in a taking will satisfy the 
prohibition under 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2006); Babbit v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 704, 708 (1995) 
(holding that the term “take” should be interpreted in the broadest possible 
language to include purposeful and indirect actions and that “significant 
habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife” 
constitutes a taking).  Actual death or injury is not necessary to show a 
 
 17. On May 9, 2006, NOAA issued an endangered species determination for two forms 
of coral.  In the announcement, NOAA determined that the species were designated as 
threatened therefore prohibitions of a Section 9 Incidental Take Permit did not apply. 50 
C.F.R. Part 223 (2006). 
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taking.  See, 40 Fed. Reg. 54748, 54750 (1981); Coho Salmon v. Pacific 
Lumber Co., 61 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1012-13 (Cal. 1999) (holding that an 
injury under an ESA claim does not require actual injury or death to the 
endangered species).  However, courts have interpreted that “harm” from 
significant habitat modification must result in the reasonably certainty of 
“threat of imminent harm to a protected species.” Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1999).  Potential or hypothetical 
injuries are generally insufficient to constitute harm.  Forest Conservation 
Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (Or. 1995).  As such, 
“harm” can be realized through the modification or degradation of a 
listed species habitat where it is shown that such modification or 
degradation, indirect or prospective, will either kill or injure wildlife 
by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including 
breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. U.S., 272 F.Supp.2d 860, 874 (Ariz. 2003). 
Under the Exceptions Section of the ESA, Section 10, the Secretary 
may permit private parties to apply to take certain endangered species that 
are otherwise protected by the Act so long as the “taking is incidental to, 
and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”  16 
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006).  In applying for an incidental take permit, 
applicants must first submit a Habitat Conservation Plan (“HCP”) that 
addresses (1) the potential impact of the taking; (2) the steps the applicant 
will take to minimize or mitigate the impact of the taking; (3) a list of 
alternatives and a description of why they were rejected; and (4) any other 
measures that the Secretary may deem appropriate.  16 U.S.C. §§ 
1539(a)(2)(A)(i) - (iv) (2006); Environmental Information Center v. Simp-
son Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000).  Next, applicants 
are required to submit an Implementation Agreement (“IA”) that describes 
how the applicant will fulfill its obligations under the HCP.  Simpson 
Timber Co., 255 F.3d at 1077. 
After opportunity for public comment, a permit application may be 
approved if the Secretary finds (1) an incidental taking; (2) all impacts from 
the proposed taking have been mitigated to the “maximum extent 
practicable;” (3) assurances of adequate funding have been made; (4) “the 
taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and 
recovery of the species;” and (5) that any conditions imposed by the 
Secretary on the Applicant are met.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(i) - (v).  
Regulations additionally require applicants to include a “‘complete’ 
description of the activity sought to be authorized” and “[t]he common and 
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scientific names of the species sought to be covered by the permit, as well 
as the number, age, and sex of such species, if known[.]” 50 C.F.R. § 
17.22(b)(1)(i)-(ii); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia 
County, Fla., 148 F.3d 1231, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 1998). Permits are const-
rued to “authorize a single transaction, a series of transactions, or a number 
of activities over a specific period of time.”  50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22 & 17.32 
(2008).  An issued permit may be revoked upon a finding by the Secretary 
that the “permittee is not complying with the terms and conditions of the 
permit.”  16 U.S.C. § 1539(2)(C) (2006).18  Parties that proceed without 
obtaining a permit, “risk [ ] civil and criminal penalties if a ‘take’ occurs.”  
Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the risks parties who do not apply for incidental take permits 
accept). 
Does Galleon’s deep sea coral drilling amount to an 
“incidental taking”? 
  
The analysis of this issue is fact based and hinges on whether 
Galleon’s drilling activities into the endangered deep sea coral constituted a 
“taking” in which case Galleon’s permit was properly denied, or an 
“incidental taking” which would have entitled Galleon to an incidental take 
permit. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006); 16 U.S.C. § 1532(14) (2006).  Or 
in other words, whether Galleon’s drilling of the endangered deep sea coral 
was its primary or secondary purpose.  Because the protections afforded 
endangered fish and wildlife are stronger than those for endangered plants, 
if Galleon’s actions qualify as a “taking,” whether or not the taking 
occurred inside or outside of the GCNMS is irrelevant.  16 U.S.C. §§ 
1538(1)(B) & (2)(B) (2006); Northern California River Watch v. Wilcox, 
547 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1074 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (stating that “the fish and 
wildlife protections apply anywhere in the United States,” and are not 
solely applicable to Federal Lands”). 
Galleon’s Argument 
Galleon will first argue that coral is not classified as a fish or wildlife 
under the ESA and therefore the company was not required to apply for an 
Incidental Take Permit.  In the event the deep sea coral is found to be 
subject to Section 9, Galleon will next argue that the Secretary acted 
 
 18. There is a hardship exemption in § 1539(b) of the Act, however, there are 
insufficient facts in the record to support a claim by Galleon under this provision.  16 U.S.C. 
§ 1539(b) (2006). 
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arbitrarily and capriciously in denying it a Section 9 permit on grounds that 
the company’s actions constituted an “incidental take.” 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain and the United States will argue that coral is a microscopic 
marine mammal and should therefore be eligible for the protections offered 
under Section 9.  Spain and the United States will further argue that the 
Secretary acted properly in denying Galleon a permit because their actions 
constituted a “taking.” 
Cases Discussing “Takings” 
In analyzing the takings issue, the following cases are helpful.  
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 924-25 (9th Cir. 
1999), the Ninth Circuit Affirmed the district court’s decision that the 
construction of a new high-school complex by a local Tucson school district 
did not constitute a taking of the endangered cactus ferruginous pygmy owl.  
Id. at 927.  Specifically, the court found that the construction did not 
constitute a taking because 1) an owl was living on a part of the site that 
was not being developed; and 2) the alleged “harm” that might occur to the 
pygmy owl because of the construction of the school complex was too 
speculative because there was contradictory expert evidence indicating that 
pygmy owls well tolerated human activities.  Id. at 926-27. 
In San Carlos Apache Tribe v. U.S., 272 F.Supp.2d 860 (Ariz. 2003), 
the Arizona district court found that Plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden in 
showing that the release of waters from the San Carlos Reservoir would 
cause harm to endangered bald eagles sufficient to constitute a taking.  Id. 
at 866-67. Specifically, Plaintiffs failed to show that the summertime 
draining of the lake would decrease the bald eagles’ food supply in the long 
term and increase their exposure to disease in the short term, thereby 
constituting an imminent and significant habitat modification and not just a 
speculative injury to the eagles.  Id.  at 876-80.  The court held that that the 
habitat modification that would result from the decreased reservoir levels 
only suggested a potential injury that was not actual or imminent enough to 
qualify as a taking.  Id. at 880. 
In Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 
(9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that 
the Defendant’s actions of allowing mouflon sheep to occupy the same area 
as the endangered Palila, a finch billed bird native to Hawaii, constituted a 
taking under the ESA.  Id. at 1110.  The court held that the habitat of the 
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Palila was significantly degraded, and injury to the animal was imminent 
because the grazing habits of the mouflon sheep destroyed the manmade 
woodlands and manmade pods upon which the Palila exclusively depended 
for food.  Id. at 1107-10. 
 
C.  Questions 
  
1.  For Galleon: 
  
a. What is the purpose and scope of the ESA?  
b. Can you describe for me what this Court should be looking at in 
order to determining whether the Secretary of Commerce acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Galleon’s permit?  
c. For the purpose of determining whether Galleon’s activities 
constitute a “take,” what was Galleon’s primary purpose in drilling 
into the endangered deep sea coral?  
d. If this Court finds that Galleon’s actions caused significant habitat 
degradation for the endangered coral, did Galleon’s actions 
constitute a taking under the ESA? 
2. For Spain and the United States: 
a. Do Incidental Take Permits apply to the sanctuary’s endangered 
Johnson seagrasses?   
b. It is undisputed that Incidental Take Permits apply to endangered 
species of fish and wildlife, generally defined as “animals.”  
However here, the endangered species is deep sea coral.  Can you 
describe for me what coral is? And more specifically does it qualify 
as an animal?  
c. What factors in the record support that Galleon’s activities 
constituted an incidental take and are thereby exempt from 
permitting?  
d. Did Galleon’s activities cause sufficient harm to the coral to 
constitute a taking? 
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ISSUE VI: 
WHETHER A COE AND / OR NPDES PERMIT IS REQUIRED 
FOR GALLEON’S SALVAGE ACTIVITIES. 
A.  Positions of the Parties 
 Galleon argues that neither a COE nor a NPDES permit was 
required for its activities.  
 Spain argues that both permits were required.  
 The United States argues that both permits were required. 
B.  Discussion 
After NOAA denied Galleon a research and recovery permit, Galleon 
decided to continue its excavation efforts both within and outside of the 
GCNMS.  R 6.  In order to excavate the wreck and its cargo, Galleon first 
constructed a drilling platform to drill into the endangered deep sea coral 
which Galleon believed encased the remains of a ship and its cargo.  R 6.  
Afterwards, Galleon employed prop wash deflectors, or mailboxes, to scour 
the sediment, sand, and vegetation in order to gain access to the artifacts.  R 
6.  In its October 15, 2008, Order the District Court held that the waters off 
the coast of New Union have been used historically for interstate commerce 
and therefore qualified as navigable-in-fact.  R 11.  The court further found 
that Galleon violated both the RHA 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., (2006) and the 
CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006), when it obstructed navigation by 
constructing a drilling platform within the twenty-four mile contiguous 
zone without the authorization of the COE, and when Galleon discharged 
dredged material (propwash from mailboxing), a pollutant, into the 
navigable waters of the United States without a permit.  R 11. 
Overview of the RHA 
Article 1 Section 8 of the Commerce Clause grants Congress the 
power to regulate commerce.  U.S. Const. Art. 1 § 8.  Pursuant to this 
authority it has designated the navigable waters of the United States as the 
“public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by 
Congress.” Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. U.S., 389 U.S. 191, 201 (1967) (citing 
Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 725 (1865).  Therefore, “the 
federal government is charged with ensuring that navigable waterways, like 
any other route of commerce over which it has assumed control, remain free 
of obstruction.”  Wyandotte, 389 U.S. at 201. 
42https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
26.2_NELMCC_JE_MEMO 8/5/2009  12:44 AM 
2009] NELMCC JUDGES’ EDITION MEMORANDUM 583 
The origin of the RHA dates back to the 1800s, after an unpopular 
Supreme Court decision found that there was no common law prohibition 
against obstructions or nuisances in navigable waters. Willamette Iron 
Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888) (finding that a state may obstruct 
a river through the construction of a bridge in the absence of any federal 
legislation to the contrary).  In response, Congress passed Section 10 of the 
RHA in order to prohibit the “creation of any obstruction not affirmatively 
authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of 
the United States.”  33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).  The Act further prohibits the 
construction of any “wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, 
bulkhead, jetty or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, 
canal, navigable river or other water of the United States.”  33 U.S.C. § 403 
(2006).  The COE regulations clarify this definition of  “structure” to mean, 
“any pier, boat dock, boat ramp, wharf, dolphin, weir, boom, breakwater, 
bulkhead, revetment, riprap, jetty, artificial island, artificial reef, permanent 
mooring structure, power transmission line, permanently moored floating 
vessel, piling, aid to navigation, or any other obstacle or obstruction.”  33 
C.F.R. § 322.2 (2008).  Moreover, the Act further prohibits excavating or 
filling a navigable water in order to “alter or modify its course, location, 
condition, [ ] capacity . . . or channel.” 19  33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).  While 
courts have generally applied this prohibition to structures, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the phrase “any obstruction” broadly, by stating: 
It is not a prohibition of any obstruction to the navigation, but any 
obstruction to the navigable capacity, and anything, wherever done 
or however done, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United 
States, which tends to destroy the navigable capacity of one of the 
navigable waters of the United States, is within the terms of the 
prohibition. 
U. S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 708 (1899); U.S. 
v. Republic Steel Corp., 362, U.S. 482, 486-87 (1960) (holding that the 
term obstruction should be interpreted broadly to encompass accumulations 
of waste deposits in riverbeds). 
RHA permits under Section 10 are governed by COE regulation 33 
C.F.R. § 325 (2008).  The permit process generally requires a pre-
application consultation and an application containing: 1) a description of 
 
 19. Parties may attempt to argue that a Section 10 excavation and fill permit may be 
applicable here, however, there are insufficient facts in the record to show that Galleon’s 
actions are in fact “alter[ing] or modify[ing the] course, location, condition, [ ] capacity … or 
channel” of the contiguous zone.19.33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006). 
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the proposed activity and any activities that are reasonably related; 2) 
whether the project requires dredging; 3) whether the dredging results in a 
discharge and what the impact on the water body is because of the 
discharge; 4) if the project requires the construction of a filled area, 
impound structure, or artificial reef; and 5) a signature.  33 C.F.R. § 325 
(2008).  However, the regulations also provide for different exemptions for 
Section 10 permits including activities requiring nationwide permits, 33 
C.F.R. § 330 (2008); activities that were commenced and completed before 
May 27, 1970, 33 C.F.R. § 322.4(a) (2008); and construction of wharves 
and piers in single state navigable bodies of water that have historically 
been used for interstate commerce, 33 C.F.R. § 322.4(b) (2008).  
Ultimately, permits can be revoked if the revocation is found to be in the 
public interest.  33 C.F.R. § 325.7(d) (2008).   
Section 13 of the RHA, known as the Refuse Act prohibits the 
discharge of “any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other 
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing there from in a liquid 
state, into any navigable water of the United States,” without a permit.  33 
U.S.C. § 407 (2006).  Historically, courts have interpreted this provision 
broadly to include such things as suspended solids.  U.S. v. Republic Steel 
Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 490-91 (1961) (finding that suspended industrial waste 
particles discharged from a mill into a navigable body of water required a 
Section 13 COE permit). 
Do the prohibitions in the RHA apply to Galleon’s activities in the US 
contiguous zone?  
The issue here is whether the prohibitions of the RHA apply to the 
construction of a drilling platform in the contiguous zone of the United 
States which extends from 12 to 24 miles off shore, beyond the twelve mile 
territorial seas.20  Here, the wreck to which Galleon is seeking title is 
located approximately twenty-three to twenty-four nautical miles off the 
coast of New Union at a depth of 600 ft.  R 3, 5.  The District Court held 
that the waters off the coast of New Union were historically used in 
interstate commerce and therefore qualified as navigable in fact.  R 11. 
 
 20. There are no additional facts found in the Record describing the nature or form of the 
drilling platform including whether or not it was a temporary or a fixed structure. 
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Galleon’s Argument 
Galleon will argue that the RHA is not applicable because the 
company’s drilling platform was neither permanently nor temporarily 
attached to the sea floor. Galleon does not have a strong argument with 
regard to whether Congress made the RHA applicable beyond US territory, 
as it explicitly did in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain and the United States will argue that under the OCSLA the 
United States has jurisdiction over the soil and subsoil of the outer 
continental shelf where Galleon drilled into the seabed floor and into the 
endangered deep sea coral. 
There is no issue as to whether the seas are navigable.  They are under 
any definition.  The issue is whether Congress, either explicitly or implicitly 
made certain US laws applicable beyond the 12 mile territorial sea. Under 
international law a coastal state has sovereign rights over its territorial sea, 
and more limited rights to take certain kinds of actions in the contiguous 
zone and the EEZ. It has substantial control over activities on the 
continental shelf.  But most of international law provisions are focused on 
the rights of the US versus the rights of other countries.  Note that Spain is 
not challenging the application of the RHA in the contiguous zone. 
Certainly the US has the right to control the conduct of its nationals, 
e.g., Galleon, probably anywhere in the world.  But Congress has to make 
that choice.  So the relevant question is, did Congress intend to make the 
RHA applicable beyond US territory?  The answer is that it explicitly did in 
the OCSLA.  In enacting the OCLSA, Congress extended the laws of the 
United States “to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf” as 
well as to temporary or artificial structures that are attached to the sea floor 
in order to pursue different resources.  43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).  The 
phrase “outer Continental Shelf” as defined in the OCSLA to mean “all 
submerged lands lying seaward and outside the area of lands beneath 
navigable waters.”  43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2008).  Moreover, Section 1333(e) 
of the OCSLA grants the COE the ability to prevent obstructions to 
navigation in the navigable waters of the United States thereby extending 
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all artificial islands and all installations and other devices 
permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be 
erected thereon for the purposes of exploring for, developing, or 
producing resources there from, or any such installation or other 
device (other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting 
such resources. 
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Army, 398 
F.3d 105, 108-09 (1st Cir. 2005 (emphasis omitted) (finding that even 
though the term “resource” was not defined in the OCSLA, and while all 
other listed terms were defined relating to mineral extraction, that Congress 
intended § 1333(e) to apply to all structures and not just those related to 
mineral extraction). 
Did Galleon’s activities require an RHA Section 10 structure permit? 
In the event that the RHA applies to the contiguous zone, it is highly 
likely that the drilling platform that Galleon built in order to drill through 
the endangered deep sea coral will have qualified as a “structure” under the 
COE regulations thereby requiring Galleon to obtain a Section 10 permit. 
In U.S. v. Republic Steel Corp., 362, U.S. 482, 486-87 (1960), the 
Supreme Court held that a discharge of waste from an industrial site that 
caused build up and shoaling constituted an obstruction under the RHA. 
In U.S. v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333,  (2d Cir.2002) the Second Circuit held 
the defendant violated Section 10 of the RHA by failing to apply for a 
permit for floats mounted to an attached pier and floating dock located in a 
tidal canal. 
Did Galleon’s activities require an RHA Section 13 discharge permit? 
Regardless of whether or not the RHA applies to the contiguous zone, 
it is unlikely that the Galleon’s discharge from the mailboxing will require a 
Section 13 permit because the discharge prohibition has been preempted by 
the CWA.  33 C.F.R. § 320.2(d) (noting that even though the Refuse Act is 
still in effect, the CWA discharge prohibitions is §§ 1342 & 1345 have 
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Overview of § 404 COE Permits Under the CWA 
A CWA § 404 dredge and fill permit issued by the COE prohibits the 
discharge of a pollutant into the waters of the United States without a 
permit.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006) (stating that the Secretary of the Army, 
is authorized to “issue permits after notice an opportunity for public 
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into the navigable 
waters at specified disposal sites”).  The permitting process under § 404 is 
governed by 33 C.F.R. § 325.1 (2008) and is the same for a § 404 CWA 
permit as for a Section 10 RHA permit.  See supra. 
A CWA § 404 permit uses the CWA definition of “pollutant” as it 
applies to such dredge materials as “dredged spoil, solid waste . . . 
biological materials . . . heat . . . rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt.”  33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1362(6) (2006). COE regulations further clarify this prohibition by 
defining “dredged material” to mean “material that is excavated or dredged 
from waters of the United States” and “discharge of dredged material” to 
represent an “addition of dredged material into, including redeposit of 
dredged material other than incidental fallback within, the waters of the 
United States.” 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(c) & (d)(1) (2008). In contrast, 
incidental fallback, discharges of pollutants from onshore processing of 
dredged material, and activities that solely involve the cutting and removing 
of vegetation without disturbing the roots systems do not constitute a 
discharge of dredged material into the waters of the United States.  33 
C.F.R. § 323.2(3)(i)-(iii) (2008). Examples of discharges of dredged 
material include, but are not limited to, 1) adding dredged material to a site 
within the waters of the United States; 2) runoff or overflow from a 
“contained land or water disposal area;” and 3) “any addition, including 
redeposit other than incidental fallback, of dredged material, including 
excavated material, into waters of the United States which is incidental to 
any activity, including mechanized land clearing, ditching, channelization, 
or other excavation.”  33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(d)(1)(i)-(iii)(2008).  Conversely, 
the following activities are considered to be “non-prohibited” discharges of 
dredge or fill material: A) farming and other agricultural activities; B) 
maintenance or reconstruction of emergency damaged structures; C) the 
construction and maintenance of farm stock ponds or irrigation and 
drainage ditches; D) the construction of temporary sedimentation basins; E) 
the construction and maintenance of farm roads; F) any activity where a 
State delegated dredge and fill permit has been issued.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) 
(2006). 
Furthermore, “fill material” is also defined in COE regulations to mean 
material placed in the waters of the United States that “has the effect of 
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replacing any portion of a water of the United States with dry land or 
changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United 
States.”  33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(e)(1)(i)-(ii) (2008).  Examples of fill material 
include “rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips, 
over burden from mining and other excavation activities, and material used 
to create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of the United States.” 
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(2) (2008).  Likewise, the addition of fill material 
“generally includes, without limitation” such activities as “placement of 
overburden, slurry, or tailings or similar mining-related materials.” 33 
C.F.R. § 323.2(f) (2008). 
Moreover, under the COE’s regulations “waters of the United States” 
is defined as “all waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, 
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all 
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.”  33 C.F.R. § 
328.3(a)(1).  As such, the regulatory jurisdiction of the COE is generally 
limited to waters three nautical miles seaward of the baseline, 33 C.F.R. § 
329.12(a) (2008); however, their jurisdiction is extended over the Outer 
Continental Shelf for purposes of enforcement of the RHA, 33 C.F.R. § 
322.3(b) (2008). 
Does the mailbox technique employed by Galleon constitute exempt 
incidental fallback or the discharge of a “dredge and fill material” into 
the waters of the United States for the purposes of a CWA § 404 
permit? Is Galleon “discharging a pollutant” from its operations? 
The problem in the case highlights the subtle difference between the 
CWA § 502 definition of discharge of a pollutant (which includes 
discharges in the contiguous zone that are not from a vessel) and the EPA 
regulatory definition of a discharge of a pollutant (which includes 
discharges in the contiguous zone from a vessel that is not being used for 
transportation purposes).  See 40 CFR 122.2 (2008). 
CWA § 502 defines “discharge of a pollutant” as 
  
(a) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source,  
(b) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone 
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33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006) (emphasis added). Galleon could argue that its 
salvage operation qualifies as a vessel and thus that its propwash discharge 
is excluded from the scope of the CWA. 
By contrast, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a 
slightly different regulatory definition for “discharge of a pollutant.”  
According to EPA, discharge of a pollutant means: 
(a) Any addition of any “pollutant” or combination of pollutants to 
“waters of the United States” from any “point source,” or 
(b) Any addition of any pollutant or combination of pollutants to the 
waters of the “contiguous zone” or the ocean from any point source 
other than a vessel or other floating craft which is being used as a 
means of transportation. 
40 C.F.R. 122.2 (2008) (emphasis added). 
The “incidental fallback” argument is a red herring – ”incidental 
fallback” covers the situation where dredged material is being removed 
from the water for disposal NOT in the water, and some of the material 
“incidentally” falls back. Here, all of the dredged material is falling back – 
the fall back is not “incidental” – it is the way all the material is being 
disposed of. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, is on point for this 
situation, since it deals with bottom sediments stirred up by boat propellers.  
In United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, 722 F.2d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 
1985), the Eleventh Circuit held that “the redepositing of soil dredged up by 
the tug’s propellers onto the adjacent sea grass beds clearly disturbs the 
“physical and biological integrity” of the subject areas and constituted a 
violation of the CWA.  In this case, the court found “dredged spoil” to 
include chopped up vegetation and sediment that had resettled onto an 
adjacent seabed.   
Galleon used prop wash deflectors, or mailboxes, to scour the 
sediment, sand, and vegetation from the ocean floor after drilling, in order 
to gain access to the embedded wreck.  R 6.  In its Order the District Court 
held that Galleon violated the prohibitions of the CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1311 
(2006), when it discharged a pollutant and dredged material into the waters 
of the United States without a permit.  R 11. 
Galleon’s Argument 
Just as in the RHA jurisdictional argument above, Galleon will first 
argue that because their drilling platform was neither permanently or 
temporarily attached to the sea floor and their operations were solely within 
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the seas of the contiguous zone, the United States does not retain 
jurisdiction because in the absence of explicit language to the contrary, the 
jurisdiction of the United States ends at the territorial seas.  In the event that 
there is jurisdiction, Galleon will then argue that their activities are exempt 
from permitting as incidental fallback. 
Under the regulatory definition of “discharge of a pollutant”, Galleon 
will argue that its that its activities are not covered because they are 
operating a vessel (under the statutory definition) and that the vessel also is 
being used as a means of transportation (the regulatory definition) (in that 
the company transported its people to the salvage site).  Galleon also will 
argue that EPA’s regulatory definition is not entitled to deference because it 
differs from the precise statutory language. 
Spain and the United States’ Arguments 
Spain and the United States will also argue for a second time that 
Galleon drilled into the seabed floor and into the endangered deep sea coral, 
therefore the United States retains jurisdiction over the subsoil of the outer 
continental shelf under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).  
In the alternative, Spain and the United States will argue under the CWA, 
the Commerce Clause, and International treaties, that they have an interest 
in extending their control into the contiguous zone in order to regulate 
natural and cultural resources.  In the event there is jurisdiction, Spain and 
the United States will then argue that Galleon’s prop-wash effluent 
constitutes either the significant excavation and redeposit of a dredged 
material, or the placement of fill material that changes the bottom elevation 
of any portion of the waters of the United States. 
For a discussion of the COE’s jurisdiction in the contiguous zone, see 
supra Issue VI. 
The U.S. also will argue that once Galleon anchored its operation and 
began salvage operations, the vessel was no longer “being used as a means 
of transportation” and thus its discharge of pollutants is covered by the 
CWA and requires a permit.  The U.S. will also have to argue that its 
regulatory definition is entitled to deference.  In the event deference is not 
given, the U.S. will argue that Galleon is operating a fixed structure, not a 
vessel or floating craft. 
During discussions, parties should discuss the leading case of National 
Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in which 
the D.C. District Court found that the failure of the COE to establish a 
“bright line” test for determining which discharges qualified as incidental 
fallback was unconstitutional.  National Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. 
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Army Corps of Engineers, 2007 WL 259944, 2-4 (D. D.C. 2007).  In 
National Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
plaintiffs sued challenging the facial constitutionality of the COE’s 2001 
regulations defining  “discharge of dredged material” (the Tulloch II rule) 
and “incidental fallback.” Id. Specifically, plaintiff’s challenged the 
language that “landclearing, ditching, channelization, in-stream mining or 
other earth-moving activity in waters of the United States as resulting in a 
discharge of dredged material unless project-specific evidence shows that 
the activity results in only incidental fallback,” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(i) 
(2008), and that “incidental fallback” should include the redepositing of 
small amounts of dredged material in “substantially the same place as the 
initial removal” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(ii) (2008). The regulation 
additionally emphasized that the fallback must be incidental to the 
excavation activity; common examples of incidental fallback included the 
soil disturbed from shoveling, and back-spill from a bucket. 33 C.F.R. § 
323.2(d)(2)(ii) (2008).  After analyzing the language, the court held that the 
regulations were unconstitutional because the regulation: 1) required 
agencies to obtain project specific evidence from projects over which they 
lacked jurisdiction; and 2) the “incidental fallback provision failed to 
address a time limitation or a volume amount.  National Ass’n of Home 
Builders, 2007 WL 259944 at 2-4. 
Cases Discussing Incidental Fallback 
In discussing the issue of what activities constitute incidental fall, the 
following cases are helpful to this analysis.  
In U.S. v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 269-71(4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth 
Circuit held that § 404 permits include “sidecasting” or the practice of 
“mov[ing] native wetland a few feet to the side of the ditch being created.”  
Id.  The court further held that sidecasting in this sense does not constitute 
incidental fallback. 
In United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, 722 F.2d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 
1985), the Eleventh Circuit held that “the redepositing of soil dredged up by 
the tug’s propellers onto the adjacent sea grass beds clearly disturbs the 
“physical and biological integrity” of the subject areas and constituted a 
violation of the CWA.  In this case, the court found “dredged spoil” to 
include chopped up vegetation and sediment that had resettled onto an 
adjacent seabed.   
In U.S. v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc., 33 F.Supp.2d 596, 608 
(E.D.Mich 1999) the court held that the “use of indigenous bog vegetation 
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and clays to create haul roads and windrow foundations can constitute the 
discharge of ‘fill materials’ under the Act.” 
In Avoyelles Sportmen’s League v Alexander, 473 F.Supp. 525, 532 
(WD La 1979) the court found that the leveling of wetland vegetations 
constituted “fill.” 
In Iroquois Gas Transmission System v. FERC, 145 F.3d 398, 402 
(2nd Cir. 1998) the court held that the COE regulates the backfilling of 
trenches. 
 
C.  Questions 
  
1. For Galleon: 
  
a. Did the drilling platform that Galleon constructed violate the 
provisions of the RHA or the CWA?  
b. Does the RHA have its own prohibition against discharges? If so 
should Galleon additionally have to apply to the COE for a 
discharge permit under the RHA?  
c. How far does the jurisdiction of the United States extend under the 
RHA? Does this Court have jurisdiction under the facts of this 
case?  
d. Does Galleon’s use of prop-wash deflectors qualify as the discharge 
of a pollutant?  
e. How is this case any different than the Ninth Circuit’s recent 
decision in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. U.S. E.P.A., 
537 F.3d 1006, 1013-12 (9th Cir. 2008). 
2. For Spain and the United States: 
a. What are the basic principals and prohibitions of the RHA?  
b.  If this Court finds that the drilling platform Galleon constructed 
was only a floating platform, do the provisions of the RHA apply? 
What about if this court finds the drilling platform to be a vessel?  
c. Does prop-wash constitute the discharge of a pollutant?             
52https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/13
26.2_NELMCC_JE_MEMO 8/5/2009  12:44 AM 
2009] NELMCC JUDGES’ EDITION MEMORANDUM 593 
d. How do the facts of the case here support your position that a prop-
wash deflector is a point source?  The CWA generally requires 
there to be some form of a discrete or discernable channel that 
discharge can “escape” from.  How can this occur within the 
confines of an ocean?  
e. Do Galleon’s discharges qualify as “incidental fallback” and are 
therefore exempt from a COE § 404 permit? 
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